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The purpose of this paper is to test the hypothesis 
that the factors that have produced political stability 
in Mexico have been largely absent from the political 
development experience of other Latin American countries 
that have experi~nced instability. Based on the literature 
on political development theory and on an historical 
survey of political development in Mexico, the factors 
of consensus, legitimacy and institutionalization are 
identified as having been primarily responsible for 
political stability. These factors have allowed the 
Mexican political system to respond successfully to 
the destabilizing pressures of modernization, economic 
development, social mobilization and urbanization, as 
well as the external pressures of economic dependence. 
From an analysis of political development in Argentina, 
Chile and Brazil, it is my conclusion that these countries 
have failed to develop a consensus, suffered repeated 
crises of legitimacy, and failed to develop political 
institutions to check the destabilizing forces of moderni-
zation, the military and external influences. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Political instability in one form or another 
has always been of concern to social and political philosophers. 
"Theorists from ancient times onward have repeatedly 
returned to questions related to political instability 
in their discussions of the characteristics and conditions 
of the good society, their disputations over the right 
of revolution, and their endless reconsiderations of 
the nature of justice, equality, progress, and the scores 
of other abstract ideas. 111 
During the last twenty years, however, the 
interest that scholars have shown in political stability 
has intensified. "Western social scientists have 'discovered' 
the third world where political upheaval is a prominent 
feature of the political landscape. At the same time 
many of the stable democracies have been rocked by massive 
political dissent. 112 
Why is political instability so common in 
third world countries? A partial answer would have 
to lie in the relative youth of most of these countries. 
In the 17th century a process of nation building began 
from which evolved the democracies of Europe and North 
America which, with a few exceptions, have enjoyed a 
relatively high degree of stability. For Great Britain 
this process occurred gradually over a period of 183 
years from 1649 to 1832. The United States spent 89 
years (1776 to 1865) building the institutions of a 
2 
stable government. Since 1945 about 138 new nations 
have been added to the third world, primarily in Asia 
and Africa. These nations in a very short period of 
time have had to create political institutions and processes 
that would be accepted as legitimate. They have had 
to do this while at the same time promoting industrial 
growth and modernization, meeting the demands of a more 
mobilized population and the diverse ethnic and economic 
interests within the country. It is little wonder that 
unprecedented political violence has resulted. Even 
in South America, where European colonialism ended in 
the 1820s, with few exceptions, the countries have failed 
to develop stable political institutions. 
This political instability in Latin America 
has been of concern to the United States from the time 
of the Roosevelt Corollary to the present dilemma presented 
by the revolutionary movements in several Central American 
countries. The rapidly deteriorating political situation 
in Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua as well as the 
extralegal seizures of power in some South American 
countries create a new sense of urgency for understanding 
the factors that promote development of a stable political 
system. A study of the political development of Mexico 
I 
I 
could contribute significantly to this understanding 
in several ways. First, Mexico is an example of a country 
that used revolution successfully as a means to political 
development. Perhaps similar patterns of development 
3 
could be adopted for other countries in the region. 
Unlike any other Latin American country, Mexico has 
enjoyed a relatively stable political environment for 
over half a century. It is of vital interest to the 
United States for economic and political reasons that 
Mexico maintain this stability by successfully responding 
to the new pressures that have been placed on the system 
by rapid economic growth and the current economic crisis. 
A study of how the political system has successfully 
met the challenges of the past could aid other countries 
in devising a plan of development that could lead to 
greater stability. 
A careful examination of the development of 
the Mexican political system reveals a set of factors 
that have been primarily responsible for the stability 
that the country has enjoyed. It is the contention 
of this writer that these factors have been largely 
absent in the developmental experience of Latin American 
countries that have suffered varying degrees of political 
instability. 
In support of this contention this paper will 
examine, within the context of political development 
theory, the development of political institutions and 
processes in Mexico, Argentina, Chile and Brazil. This 
examination will identify the causes of instability 
. 
in Argentina, Chile and Brazil and offer tentative proposals 
for steps that might be taken to achieve a higher degree 
4 
of stability. Argentina and Brazil were chosen because 
their level of economic development and length of independence 
roughly approximate that of Mexico. Venezuela would 
have been a logical choice for inclusion in the study 
considering the criterion of level of economic development; 
however, in the interest of limiting the scope to manageable 
proportions, Chile was selected because it affords the 
opportunity to examine the role of foreign intervention 
as an external factor in political instability. 
Chapter I of this paper is devoted to defining 
the terms "political stability" and "political development" 
and to a survey of the literature on theories related 
to political development. Chapter II contains a discussion 
of the political development of Mexico and the identification 
of those factors that have been responsible for the 
stability of the political system. Chapter III examines 
the development process of Argentina and identifies 
causes for the extraordinary level of system instability 
that the country has experienced. Chapter IV surveys 
the political history of Chile and identifies the factors 
that destabilized a polity that until 1973 had been 
considered a showcase of stable democratic development 
in Latin America. Chapter V examines the political 
system of Brazil with continued focus on identifying 
factors that have inhibited stable political development. 
A summary of the major findings of the research as well 
as conclusions concerning the future prospects for political 
5 
stability in the countries studied will be presented 
in Chapter VI. 
Historical data presented in Appendix A supports 
the designation of Mexico as a stable polity and Argentina, 
Chile and Brazil as unstable ones. 
6 
ENDNOTES 
1Lee Sigelman, "Understanding Political Instability: 
An Evaluation of the Mobilization-Institutional Approach," 
Comparative Political Studies 12(July 1972): 205. 
2 Ibid. 
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I. DEFINITIONS AND THEORIES OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 
Observation of the political development of 
western democracies led political scientists to theorize 
that political development which was generally understood 
as "stable democracy" was a direct result of economic 
development. 1 This thinking was reflected in the massive 
foreign aid programs of the cold war era. However, 
concepts relative to western nations in political development 
theory proved inadequate in the 1960s in their application 
to emerging nations. The field of comparative politics 
was inundated with new studies and reexaminations of 
concepts related to political development often adding 
more to confusion than clarification. 
The conceptualizations of political development 
that have contributed most to understanding its relationship 
to political stability are those of dichotomous typologies 
and institutionalization. In the first, political development 
is seen as continuous progress indicating movement from 
something to something else--the dichotomies of traditional 
and modern. This approach led to many theories attempting 
to clarify the impact of various aspects of modernization 
on political stability. Samuel Huntington conceptualized 
political development as movement toward institutionalization 
which, according to theory developed in his monumental 
work Political Order in Changing Societies, is the major 
factor in achieving political stability. These concepts 
8 
of modernization and institutionalization will be developed 
more fully as the theories that have emanated from them 
are discussed later in this chapter. 
Political stability is usually discussed as 
a valued condition: the result of "good" political development. 
Instability is considered to result from a lack of political 
development. Claude Ake defines political stability 
as "the regularity of the flow of political exchanges. 112 
He continues by saying, "There is political stability 
to the extent that members of society restrict themselves 
to the behavior patterns that fall within the limits 
imposed by political role expectations. 113 Ake cautions 
against confusing political stability with the absence 
of political change. Taking this into consideration, 
Ernest Duff and John Mccamant write that "A stable political 
' 
system can be defined as one which can manage change 
within the structure. 114 
Leon Hurwitz, in an excellent review article, 
identifies five approaches to the study of political 
stability and concludes that the most effective is to 
study political stability as a multifaceted social attribute. 
This view sees political stability as "systemic stability" 
5 
and is a synthesis or integration of the other approaches. 
It is in this context that theories concerning political 
stability will be reviewed and their application to 
Latin American political development examined. 
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The study of political development and political 
stability has been aided significantly by the development 
of theory. James Dougherty and Robert Pfaltzgraff describe 
theory as: 
... an intellectual tool that helps us to orient 
our knowledge, to ask significant questions, 
and to guide the formulation of priorities 
in and the design of research; it enables 
us to relate knowledge in our field to that 
of other fields; and thus it enhances our 
ability to understand and explain reality 
in a satisfying way.6 
During the period from World War I to the 
mid 1940s, theorists tended to explain political stability 
in terms of "constitutional engineering." This was 
a reflection of the current popularity of "formalism" 
in the study of comparative politics which emphasized 
the legal institutions of government: constitutions, 
presidents, legislatures and judicial systems. These 
theories were discredited by the failure of "engineered 
democratic experiments" in new nations as well as old 
ones such as Weimar Germany. 7 
The movement to behavioralism in political 
science research in the postwar years was in part a 
response to the changing political realities of the 
international system as a result of the emergence of 
the third world. Studies began to favor socio-economic 
and environmental explanations of political instability. 
For Taketsugu Tsurutan the explanation of 
political stability lay in the existence of a consensual 
10 
society. ''The most fundamental as well as general source 
of stability is the existence of consensus, viz., a 
tacit agreement engendered by a homogeneous political 
culture, between the government and the governed as 
well as among groups within the governed, concerning 
the broad goal of society within a given time context 
and the means to implement its attainment. 118 Eric Nordlinger 
also emphasizes the importance of consensus when he 
argues that 
The possibilities of a political system's 
developing in a nonviolent, nonauthoritarian 
and eventually democratic stable manner are 
maximized when a national identity emerges 
first, followed by institutionalization of 
the central government, and then by th9 emergence 
of mass parties and a mass electorate. 
A concept closely related to consensus is 
legitimacy. Lipset says that, ''Legitimacy involves 
the capacity of the system to engender and maintain 
the belief that the existing political institutions 
are the most appropriate ones for society. 1110 Douglas 
Bwy examined a number of theories of political stability 
and concluded, "It appears, therefore, that the causes 
of political instability are numerous and the relationship 
11 is indeed complex." He also turns to legitimacy for 
a better explanation. 
Other writers have combined legitimacy with 
effectiveness in explaining stability. "Instability 
is brought about by a population that considers the 
political system to be illegitimate and/or ineffective, 
and by political institutions which cannot meet the 
demands and needs of the society and which lack the 
capacity to adjust. 1112 
11 
Many political scientists have developed theories 
purporting to explain the relationship between modernization 
and political stability. Some writers contend that 
there is a positive correlation between the two. Examples 
of such viewpoints are Seymour Lipset's Political Man 
and Gabriel Almond and James Coleman's The Politics 
of Developing Nations. More recently, however, other 
writers have expressed the view that modernization leads 
instead to political instability. The literature on 
this viewpoint is so large and the aspects of modernization 
examined so numerous that it is difficult to discuss 
it in any organized fashion. 
The most comprehensive study to date connecting 
modernization and political stability is Huntington's 
Political Order in Changing Societies. He challenges 
the "poverty theses" and the conclusion that social 
and economic backwardness are responsible for instability. 
"Wealthier nations tend to be more stable than those 
less wealthy, but the poorest nations, those at the 
bottom of the international economic ladder, tend to 
be less prone to violence and instability than those 
countries just above them. 1113 This observation led 
him to his often quoted conclusion that "modernity breeds 
stability and modernization breeds instability." 
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The two aspects of modernization that seem 
to have received the most attention from theorists are 
economic development and social mobilization. Economic 
development is viewed as a destabilizing factor in political 
development because of the tremendous and far reaching 
changes it brings to the social as well as economic 
structure of society and the additional pressures it 
places on the political system to satisfy needs. "The 
most important reason why economic development sometimes 
fails to produce political stability is that while the 
economy is making it possible for the political and 
economic systems to satisfy the demands of the population, 
it is also raising the level of expectations. 1114 According 
to Robert Clark, "Ideas about what people think they 
should achieve in politics begin to outreach the institutions 
available to help them achieve these objectives. The 
results are frustration, anger, aggression and a generally 
increased level of political instability. 1115 
Economic development and the growth of industry 
give rise to a new urban middle class. Their increased 
desire to have a share of the political power brings 
them into direct conflict with the rural oligarchy which 
has been the seat of power in traditional societies. 
This conflict during the early stages of modernization 
can inhibit national integration and at the worst lead 
to civil war. 
13 
Industrial development has always been accompanied 
by massive rural to urban migrations that have a great 
potential for political instability. 16 Another problem 
of rapid urbanization results when the number of people 
migrating to the cities exceeds industrial capacity 
to provide employment. Shanty towns have grown up around 
most of the major cities of Latin America where the 
people live in grim poverty. "The poor provide the 
potential for extraordinary political instability. 1117 
A review of research produces inconclusive 
evidence of the linkage between income inequality and 
political instability. Conventional wisdom has held 
for a long time that the high level of income inequality 
in Latin America was a major cause of instability. 
Samuel Huntington alludes to this when he states, "In 
particular modernizing countries the impact of economic 
g~owth on income inequality may become quite noticeable. 
The twenty years before the revolution in Mexico witnessed 
a tremendous growth in income inequalities, particularly 
in land ownership. 1118 In addition Huntington contends 
that 
Modernization affects economic inequality 
and thus political instability in two ways. 
First, wealth and income are normally more 
unevenly distributed in poor countries than 
in economically developed countries .... Social 
mobilization, however, increases awareness 
of the inequality and presumably resentment 
of it .... Hence social mobilization turns the 
traditional e!§nomic inequality into a stimulus 
to rebellion. 
14 
He does conclude, however, that the scarcity of data 
on wealth and income make it impossible to test the 
proposition that economic inequality leads to political 
instability. 
The "social mobilization" to which Huntington 
refe~red is a term developed by Karl Deutsch to deal 
with the aspects of modernization that produce a more 
politically aware citizenry and increased demands on 
the political system. Some of the social mobilization 
indicators identified by Deutsch are: exposure to modern 
aspects of life, exposure to mass media, change of residence., 
urbanization, change from agricultural occupations, 
1 . t d . t . 20 Th. . d f . 1 1 eracy an per cap1 a income. 1s 1n ex o soc1a 
mobilization has many implications for political development 
and stability. Social mobilization increases the number 
of meaningful political actors who must be accommodated 
within the political process. This in turn brings pressure 
for structural changes that will make the system more 
responsive. The size of the government sector in the 
economy increases with social mobilization, and a more 
sophisticated bureaucracy must be developed. Rapid 
social mobilization can be a positive influence for 
nationalism in homogeneous societies; however, it can 
be a disruptive factor in societies split by religious, 
linguistic and social diversity. 
Huntington states that 
15 
The relationship between social mobilization 
and political instability seems reasonably 
direct. Urbanization, increases in literacy, 
education and media exposure all give rise 
to enhanced aspirations and expectations which, 
if unsatisfied, galvanize individuals and 
groups into politics. In the absence of strong 
and adaptable political institutions, such 
increases in ~rrticipation mean instability 
and violence. 
An important part of Huntington's work in 
political development theory deals with developing the 
concept of "institutionalization." As modernization 
and social mobilization place pressures on the political 
system, stability can be maintained only if the political 
system is sufficiently institutionalized. The level 
of institutionalization, according to Huntington, can 
be defined by the adaptability, complexity, autonomy 
and coherence of the organization and procedures of 
22 the political system. He contends that dissatisfaction, 
resentment and rebellion result when political institutions 
are inadequate to meet the demands of social mobilization. 
However, some critics of Huntington's theory point out 
that social mobilization can produce higher levels of 
support for the political system and actually be a stimulus 
for institution building. 23 
All factors that have influenced political 
stability in Latin America do not fit neatly within 
the modernization-institutionalization framework. One 
such influence is the military and the role that it 
has played in Latin American politics. Traditional 
16 
analysts have tended to view the military as playing 
a very negative role in political development. The 
armed forces have often been held responsible for the 
instability in such countries as Argentina where coups 
have overthrown civilian governments with almost predictable 
regularity. 
Revisionist analysts, however, view military 
intervention not as a cause of political instability 
but a symptom of it. Thompson sees the military coup 
as "a manifestation of political violence in a system 
lacking an acceptable political formula. 1124 Huntington 
also supports a less critical view of the role of the 
military. He has found that coups occurring in the 
early stages of development are generally what he terms 
as "modernizing coups." The military at this point 
is more liberal in its viewpoint and is assisting the 
middle class in broadening the base of political participation 
and weakening the control of the rural oligarchy. In 
later stages of development, however, Huntington found 
the military playing a more conservative role in maintaining 
system stability by exercising "veto coups." Coups 
of this type are designed to halt the process of expanding 
political participation that threatens to bring the 
lower classes to full political power. 25 
The survey of political stability theory to 
this point has dealt only with factors that occur within 
17 
the political system. Some political scientists have 
turned to an examination of external factors and their 
linkage to political development in third world countries. 
"Too often it is assumed that national systems are completely 
autonomous political units and that phenomena such as 
political instability may be explained solely with reference 
to factors internal to the nation state. 1126 
Two areas that have been given attention are 
the impact that foreign military aid has on political 
development and of foreign investments on economic development. 
Some research has shown that military aid is a negative 
factor in political development because by keeping the 
military strong popular revolution and expansion of 
political participation are thwarted. "It can surely 
be said that much of the political instability in contemporary 
Latin America can be blamed on the United States' support 
of military dictatorships. 1127 
The impact of foreign investment and trade 
on economic, social and political development in third 
world countries is incorporated in dependency theory. 
Economists working on the Economic Commission on Latin 
America sponsored by the United Nations developed the 
concepts of dependency theory to explain the underdevelopment 
that exists in certain countries by focusing on the 
unequal terms of trade between those countries that 
export raw materials (periphery) and those that export 
\ 
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manufactured goods (center). 28 Within this world systems 
approach the system of unequal exchanges.allows the 
core regions to exploit the periphery through ·various 
mechanisms such as multinational corporations 'and international 
lending institutions. 
Through a variety of propositions, dependency 
theory links dependent economic development to: external 
manipulation, social development and political stability. 
"More broadly, Latin America's historical patterns of 
external linkages, some of which can be subsumed under 
the heading of dependency, could be treated as independent 
variables with pronounced effects on Latin American 
political structure and political behavior. 1129 
Ayers also suggests that the greater a country's 
dependency the less capable it is of regulating the 
actors within the system, the more difficult it will 
be to establish legitimacy and stability in the decision-making 
process and the greater the inequality in distribution 
of power among groups in society. Ayers also contends 
that dependency inhibits political institutionalization 
and the unification and creation of a distinctive national 
culture. 30 
According to dependency theory, the center 
is in a position to influence development in the periphery 
in a variety of ways. When the productive apparatus 
in the periphery is foreign owned it is conditioned 
19 
more to the needs of the center than to the development 
and expansion of the host country. In the world economic 
system the comparative advantage of the periphery is 
generally its cheap labor supply. Thus, a low standard 
of living becomes the basis of dependent development. 
The low wages paid to workers discourages the development 
of industry in the periphery that would be directed 
toward the production of goods for local mass consumption. 
Instead goods are produced for export or for consumption 
by the elite since they are too expensive to be purchased 
by the masses. "Because they are effectively barred 
from economic participation, to allow them political 
participation would be disruptive. Social and cultural 
exclusion follow from political and economic exclusion. 1131 
Multinational corporations are the prim~ry 
vehicles by which the center carries out its economic 
control of the periphery. They have been held responsible 
for contributing to developmental discord in a variety 
of ways. First, the strategic decisions concerniqg 
development methods and technologies to be used are 
made in the center, not in the periphery. Secondly, 
multinationals do not take new technology to the periphery, 
thus denying that country of the "windfall profits" 
that result from new product development. In addition, 
multinationals attempt to cultivate similar consumer 
tastes in the periphery as exist in the center. "Reluctant 
20 
to invest in innovative activity that might produce 
a more locally appropriate technology, the multinational 
is anxious to market existing ideas regardless of appropriateness."32 
Multinationals are also the source of much 
of the direct foreign investment that some writers contend 
can destabilize the political system of the periphery. 
Reliance on foreign loans can lead to heavy indebtedness. 
During periods of economic decline international lending 
institutions can impose austerity programs as a prerequisite 
for continued loans to service the existing debt. The 
government is forced to severely curtail social welfare 
programs for the poor. Also when foreign investors 
are used as the source of capital for industrialization, 
there are usually strings attached that are not in the 
best interest of the country as it attempts to moye 
toward economic independence. 33 
On the surface dependency theory seems to 
present a logical explanation for the continued underdevelopment 
of certain countries. However, upon closer examination 
many writers express problems with the general acceptability 
of dependency theory. Some charge that its definitions 
are not precise and cannot be easily operationalized. 
The theory is also criticized because it places an over-
reliance on a monocausal explanation of the problem 
of underdevelopment and cannot be supported empirically. 34 
21 
Table 1 
Factors Affecting Political Stability - Instability 
Factors Promoting Stability 
Consensus 
Legitimacy 
Institutionalization 
Factors Promoting Instability 
Modernization 
Economic Development 
Social Mobilization 
Urbanization 
Military 
External Factors 
Foreign Interference 
Economic Dependency 
22 
To summarize the survey of theories related 
to political development just presented, it would seem 
that three general theories have been offered to explain 
political stability. First, there should be a basic 
consensus within society as to the goals and objectives 
of the government and the direction that it should take. 
Also, the government must be considered legitimate and 
effective in reaching these goals and objectives. And 
finally, stability is promoted by the institutionalization 
of the political actors and processes to the point that 
adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence are 
achieved. 
Many of the theories that have been advanced 
to explain political instability deal with the phenomena 
of modernization and the attending developments of economic 
development, social mobilization and urbanization. 
Large, well trained and financed military forces are 
also held to be an internal factor promoting political 
instability. 
A body of theory of more recent origin deals 
with the impact of factors external to the nation state 
on its stability. The dependent status of third ~orld 
countries within the world economic order retards economic 
as well as political development. Political stability 
is also jeopardized by direct foreign interference in 
23 
domestic political affairs as well as major power'manipulation 
of international lending institutions. 
We turn now to a discussion of politica1 development 
in Mexico and application of the theories presented 
in explaining the political stability of that country. 
24 
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN MEXICO 
Mexico was set on the course of develop~ng 
its own political traditions with the revolt against 
Spanish rule in 1810. An uprising led by Father Miguel 
Hidalgo y Costilla on September 16 spread throughout 
Mexico in a series of wars that lasted for eleven years. 
Spain conceded defeat in 1821 and left the revolutionary 
leadership at the threshold of political power for which 
they were sadly unprepared. As one historian has asked, 
How does one create a nation out of a newly 
independent state when the political atmosphere 
27 
is pervaded by accrimony and mistrust? The 
question obsessed hundreds of Latin American 
leaders in early nineteenth century once parental 
authority had been successfully challenged. 
Iturbide [Augustine de Iturbide was a leader 
of the revolutionary movement and Emperor 
of Mexico from 1822 to 1823.] did not have 
all the answers, but he felt that he had one 
reliable formula. Identify the head of government 
with the state, subsume the two into one, 
and by some miraculous metamorphosis a nation 
will emerge. But the crucial element in the 
process, he believed, was to identify a[ dynamic, 
resourcjful, self-assured, and charismatic 
leader. 
From 1821 to 1860 over fifty different governments 
ruled Mexico, most gaining their position through military 
coup. General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, of Revolutionary 
War fame, was president on eleven separate occasions 
from 1835 to 1855. 
A brief period of imposed stability occurred 
when France occupied Mexico in 1863 and Napoleon III 
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installed Ferdinando Maxmillian of Hapsburg and his 
wife Marie Charlotte Amelie Leopoldine as monarchs. 
Imperial rule ended with Maxmillian before the firing 
squad, and instability ensued until Profirio Diaz seized 
power by military force and controlled Mexican politics 
for the next third of a century. 
Diaz was responsible for taking the first 
steps toward modernization by encouraging foreign investment 
and development of Mexico's natural resources. He found 
. 
many willing investors in the United States and awarded 
them contracts and concessions that were often not in 
the best interest of long term growth towards independence 
for the Mexican economy. It has been estimated that 
by the end of the period known as the Profiriato foreigners 
owned over one-fourth of the country's total land area 
and accounted for two-thirds of Mexico's total investments 
outside of those in agriculture and handicrafts. 2~ 
Modernization was accomplished at the expense 
of the peasants whose relative position steadily worsened 
during the Profiriato. As land became concentrated 
i 
in the hands of a few wealthy families, the peasants 
were forced from their private and communal lands (ejidos) 
and into the thinly disguised servitude of the hacendados. 
This was accomplished mainly through the land act of 
1883 that encouraged purchase of public lands. Any 
land to which no clear title existed was considered 
public land. The peasants had for years farmed the 
land handed down to them from generation to generation 
with no thought to registering ownership. They were 
in no financial position to purchase the land that had 
been traditionally theirs; therefore, they had no choice 
29 
but to leave the land and seek the only employment available. 
This was quite often working for the hacendado who purchased 
their land. The small pay that they received was usually 
in the form of credit that could be redeemed only at 
the hacienda-operated store. 3 
Diaz also alienated himself from the Mexican 
people by his flagrant manipulation of the constitutional 
provision prohibiting reelection. The constitution 
was conveniently amended at the end of each term of 
office to allow him to remain in power. Thus, suspicion 
of foreign influence, exploitation and interference, 
the unequal distribution of land and the violation of 
the principle of no reelection formed the ideological 
base for the Revolution of 1910. These factors were 
the impetus for several constitutional provisions that 
set the guidelines within which the president ma~ exercise 
the powers of his office even today. 
Hence, the events that contribute most to 
understanding the current political culture of Mexico 
began with the revolt against the Diaz regime led by 
the wealthy, liberal hacendado Francisco Madero, ·in 
the state of Coahuila. His desires for reform, however, 
were more philosophical than material. After a year 
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of bloodshed throughout Mexico, Madero emerged as president 
in the election of 1911. Unwilling to implement the 
reforms that had formed the basis for the Revolution, 
Madero almost immediately found himself the target of 
a counter-revolution led by his former cohorts, Victoriano 
Huerta and Emiliano Zapata. 
Madero was forced to resign his off ice on 
February 19, 1913. On this day Mexico was served by 
three presidents in rapid succession. Order began to 
emerge from chaos with the implementation of the Constitution 
of 1917 and the election of presidents of the Iturbide 
model who identified strongly with the principles of 
the Revolution. Also, the impact of the emergence of 
a one-party system on the stability of government cannot 
be overemphasized. 
Plutarco Elias Calles, president of Mexico 
from 1924 to 1928, formed the Partico Nacional Revolucionario 
(PNR) in 1929 as a widely based political party that 
would give future presidents a permanent coalition with 
which to govern, thus providing the key to government 
stability. President Lazaro Cardenas, seeing the need 
for a more broadly based party to meet the economic 
challenges that were facing the government in 1938, 
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reorganized the party. Now known as the Partido Revolucionario 
Mexicano (PRM), the official party included the four 
sectors of society: agrarian, popular, military and 
labor. Reflecting the decline in importance of the 
military, Manuel Avila Comancho (1940-46) reorganized 
the party during his presidency, dropping the military 
as a separate sector and renaming the party the Partido 
Revolucionario Institutional (PRI). 
Thus, it could be argued that the three major 
factors contributing to the political stability of Mexico 
have been the Revolution, for its role in building a 
national consensus and providing the ideological basis 
on which the government bases its legitimacy; the emergence 
of a strong presidency; and the one-party political 
system. The role that has been played by these three 
factors in institutionalization and in responding' to 
the pressures of social mobilization and economic development 
brought on by modernization will be discussed in the 
pages that follow. 
During the past century revolution has been 
a key factor in the political development of many countries. 
Some have used revolution to bring about a reordering 
of the political structure, increased participation, 
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and a redistribution of power that promotes development 
on an egalitarian basis. In other countries unsuccessful 
revolutions had led instead to military dictatorships 
or a return to the traditional forms of authority. 
Samuel Huntington has written that "A full 
scale revolution involves the destruction of the old 
political institutions and patterns of legitimacy, the 
mobilization of new groups into politics, the redefining 
of the political community, the acceptance of new political 
values and new concepts of political legitimacy, the 
conquest of power by a new, more dynamic political elite, 
and the creation of new and stronger political institutions. 114 
The Revolution of 1910 produced these types of changes 
in Mexico. During the dictatorship of Profirio Diaz 
the political system could be described as "uninstitutionalized, 
personal and oligarchial rule, lacking automony, complexity, 
coherence, and adaptability. 115 This type of system 
could not cope with the increased demands produced by 
the rapid economic development. "The political system 
that emerged out of the revolution furnished Mexico 
with political stability unprecedented in Latin America 
and the political framework necessary for a new period 
of economic growth in the 1940s and 1950s. 116 
The revolution has also had the residual benefit 
of making other contributions to political stability. 
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It produced a set of egalitarian and nationalistic ideals 
and aspirations that have provided the basis for the 
legitimacy for the government and for the Mexican political 
consensus.
7 The slogans of the revolution, the mystique 
and the ideology created a wider base of political support 
and loyalty. 
From the Revolution emerged an institutionalized 
political system that concentrated power in the presidency 
but limited tenure to one six-year term. The system 
of presidential recruitment, while it might seem undemocratic, 
has produced a period of orderly political transition 
that is remarkably free of the disorder that characterized 
the political systems of the past. 
Mexico has solved the problem of charismatic, 
personalistic presidential leadership that causes many 
developing countries to be plagued with instability. 
The office of the presidency has become institutionalized, 
and the people identify more with the position than 
the person who may be holding the position at any particular 
time. Vincent Padgett points out that, "It is the office 
which commands the respect, clothes the leader with 
dignity and endows him with charismatic qualities. 118 
The Constitution in Chapter III, Article 83, 
states that "The President shall assume the duties of 
office on the first of December for a term of six years. 
A citizen who has held the office of president of the 
Republic, by popular election or by appointment as ad 
interim, provisional or substitute president can in 
no case and for no reason again hold that office." 
This rule has contributed greatly to the stability of 
the Mexican political system. If a president could 
hold power indefinitely, even though subject to periodic 
elections, other presidential hopefuls would certainly 
be more likely to resort to illegal means of removing 
him from office. "With each president limited to a 
single term, ambitious politicians can look forward 
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to several opportunities of possible presidential election, 
until the point is reached where they are too old to 
be selected but also too old to protest effective~y 
against their being passed over. 119 
A third aspect of presidential politics that 
has contributed to the orderly succession of presidents 
and thus to the stability of the system is the method 
of selecting the presidential nominees. It is generally 
acknowledged that the incumbent president holds the 
key to the selection of the PRI's candidate. That is 
not to imply that the decision is entirely unilateral. 
It would be unthinkable, however, for a candidate to 
be nominated who was unacceptable to the incumbent president. 
Indeed, the entire electoral process anxiously awaits 
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the nod from the president. Generally, the selection 
is a cooperative effort: " .•. he selects his own successor 
with the cooperation of a small clique of powerful men, 
including the living ex-presidents and his choice is 
legitimized by an election that cannot be lost. 1110 
The role of the PR! in promoting political 
stability stems primarily from its broad base of support 
and its ability to successfully balance the demands 
of the competing sectors under its umbrella. Thus, 
since the PRI is the only avenue for interest aggregation 
and articulation, it means that all competition takes 
place within the party structure and among the various 
sectors of the party. When new centers of power emerge 
that could potentially form an effective challenge to 
the government, the PR! has been successful in co-opting 
them into the broadly based structure. The PR! makes 
every effort to form interest associations with these 
groups that have previously remained unorganized. Martin 
Needler sees the single party as a strength of the political 
system because it ''removes the possibility of illegal 
opposition by disgruntled elements deliberately excluded 
from positions of power and influence. 1111 
The Role of the Military 
The role of the military in the institutional 
framework of government has been the subject of much 
debate by political development scholars. Some feel 
that the military somehow operates outside of the formal 
governmental structure; others, more correctly it seems, 
view it as one of the institutions of government. 
The military has played a prominent role in 
the governments of most Latin American countries, and 
that role does not seem to be diminishing. The armed 
forces have in one way or another been connected to 
the political instability of countries either as a cause 
of it or as a reaction to it. 
In Mexico, the relationship of the military 
to the government is unlike that in any other Latin 
American country. During the period of 1920 to 1940 
there was a conscious effort on the part of Mexico's 
presidents to reduce the political role of the military 
and thus the threat of military coups. This reduction 
in power was accomplished by rotating zone commanders 
to prevent them from building up a personal following 
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and splitting the command of Mexico City among the Presidential 
Guard, the secretary of national defense and the zone 
commander. Older officers were purged or encouraged 
to retire and the younger ones were professionalzied. 
The president controlled the rank and assignment ~ystem 
for all ranks of colonel and above. He also had control 
12 
over the budget and the procurement of equipment. 
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In effect, the military was reorganized and made subordinate 
to civilian authority. 
The military in Mexico is considered to be 
less professional than its counterpart in other Latin 
American countries and to serve as more of an internal 
police force than as a defense against foreign aggression. 
"The Mexican army is reputed to be one of the best 'tamed' 
and least political in Latin America .... Military coups 
have become virtually impracticable. 1113 
Thus, it would seem that the military in Mexico 
is not in a position to challenge presidential authority 
and moreover, that it actually functions as a support 
for the president. The fortunes of the military ebb 
and flow with the fortunes of the government. The military 
has been called on to suppress guerilla activity, restore 
order in student riots and labor disturbances, maintain 
peace.during elections and provide services of a socioeconomic 
and humanitarian nature. "Through a long history of 
rural civic action, the army has engaged in health education, 
provided applied medicine from dentistry to minor surgery, 
undertaken school and road construction and repairs, 
dispensed food supplies and clothing as well as tools 
and utensils, and has also carried out reforestation 
programs. 1114 Also, the zone commanders serve as an 
intelligence source for the president on the activities 
of state governors and as a line of communication for 
peasants who have gotten nowhere with state officials. 
"If discontented peasants feel that the state government 
or other civilian officials have blocked their petitions 
I 
from reaching presidential attention, peasant leaders 
have sometimes protested to the zone commander or sought 
his help in getting the president's attention. 1115 
The supportive role of the military is perhaps 
best summed up by David Ronfeldt . 
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... the endurance of the established Mexican 
political system has probably depended significantly 
--and will continue to depend--upon the army's 
performance of its residual political roles. 
Because of the army's impact on conflict management, 
through political communication and enforcement, 
it remains important for party-government 
stability and for elite i£6egration within 
the revolutionary family. 
Pressures Generated by Modernization 
By the 1940s, Mexico had developed political 
~ 
institutions and structure sufficiently stable to accommodate 
rapid economic growth. The Second World War and the 
Korean War created a demand for Mexican exports. With 
the industrial output of the United States direct~d 
towards the manufacture of war materials, Mexican industry 
could also fill the vacuum created by the absence of 
goods imported from the United States. 17 Between 1940 
and 1975, the GNP rose at the rate of 6 percent a year. 
Even considering the high population growth rate during 
this period, the per capita output increased at the 
rate of 3 percent a year. In the 1958-1970 period, 
the aggregate growth rates were among the highest in 
the world. 18 
The development of industry in Mexico has 
followed several phases. The period of 1880-1930 was 
characterized as a primary product export phase. The 
mining of silver, gold, copper and lead was controlled 
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by foreign capital of which United States capital constituted 
60 percent. The period of 1930-1955 was a period of 
horizontal import-substitution industrialization (!SI). 
Government policy promoted the development of local 
manufacturing of consumer goods when the Great Depression 
made export oriented growth untenable. 
The end of the Korean War brought an end to 
the economic boom that Mexico had enjoyed. Demand for 
exports fell and the country faced a severe recession 
that resulted in a 50 percent devaluation of the peso. 
It was at this point that the policy-making elites made 
the decision to shift to the vertical IS! phase of economic 
development. The object was to broaden domestic production 
and build up the local manufacture of capital and intermediate 
goods and thereby slow the drain on the country's balance 
of payments. 
John Bailey has identified several pressures 
on a political system that can be associated with industrialization 
They are: a decline in agricultural production; rapid 
urbanization; foreign penetration of certain areas of 
the economy; increasingly skewed income distribution; 
growth of capital intensive as opposed to labor intensive 
industry; adverse balance of payments and growing: foreign 
debt. 19 
Huntington and others have argued that nations 
that have highly institutionalized systems are better 
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prepared to manage the pressures brought on by socio-economic 
modernization. Attention will be focused on certain 
pressures with which the Mexican political system has 
had to cope as a result of modernization; urbanization; 
socio-economic dualism and demands for increased political 
participation. 
Urbanization 
The period of rapid urbanization in Mexico 
roughly parallels the period of rapid economic growth. 
From 1950 to 1960, the rural population increased 1.6 
percent per year while the urban population growth rate 
was 6.1 percent. The proportion of the population living 
in cities of over 10,000 rose from 12 percent in 1900 
to 38 percent in 1960. Currently, over 70 percent of 
the population is classified as urban. Research has 
indicated that urbanization promotes instability. Wayne 
Cornelius used data presented in Almond and Verba's 
41 
study Civil Culture to analyze the effect of urbanization 
in relation to three themes or clusters of propositions 
about the relationship between urbanization and political 
stability in Mexico. The first theme concerned urbanization 
as a contributor to economic frustration among the migrant 
population as a result of inadequate pre-migratidn preparation, 
restrictions on upward mobility and increased awareness 
of the condition of relative deprivation. A second 
cluster of propositions would indicate that political 
instability would result from urbanization because migrants 
experience difficulty adjusting socially and psychologically 
to the urban environment. This adjustment difficulty 
stems from the absence of a support system provided 
by the large family units, the difference in the norms 
of behavior between rural and urban areas and the frustration 
that results from the time lag between giving up old 
traditions and acquiring new ones. A third proposition 
holds that urbanization, increased awareness of government 
and politics and mobilization of radical opposition 
forces go hand in hand. 20 
Based on the data available from various urban 
studies, Cornelius found that urbanization had not contributed 
significantly to political instability for several reasons. 
The material deprivation in the city may not have been 
as severe a perceived by previous researchers. During 
the 1940-1960 period, those without access to pub~ic 
sanitation increased by only 18.9 percent while the 
urban population grew by 177.1 percent. For the majority 
of the migrants, then, the move to the city could have 
represented an improvement in conditions. Data in Civil 
Culture also indicated that the migrants were relatively 
satisfied with conditions. Of those who had lived in 
the city for 2 years or less, 41 percent indicated that 
they had definite plans for remaining. This feeling 
was expressed by 80 percent of those who had lived in 
the city at least 4 years. Cornelius also found that 
the nuclear family was not necessarily destroyed by 
the move to the city. The size of the family of the 
migrant was at least as large as the average size of 
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the family in the native village. Other findings indicate 
that similar patterns of political awareness existed 
between the long time city residents and the migrants, 
the majority of the migrants had had some preparation 
for obtaining jobs prior to migration and that migrants 
expressed a high degree of support for the political 
system. Eighty-five percent of all migrants believed 
that the ideals and goals of the revolution had been 
realized or that the people in the government were still 
working on them. Only 10 percent believed that the 
government's policies would endanger the national welfare. 21 
Cornelius found from his own studies of the 
migrant poor conducted in the early 1970s that those 
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who had been born and raised in the rural areas had 
slightly more authoritarian tendencies than the city-born 
respondents. This would seem to dispute the proposition 
that urban migrants constitute a threat to regime stability. 22 
The research also indicated that there is a degree of 
support, especially among the urban poor, for the position 
of the president as the chief authority figure charged 
• 
with guaranteeing law and order. In 1968 President 
Diaz Ordaz was responsible for the death of unarmed 
student demonstrators and by-standers in Mexico City. 
Fifty-nine percent of the low income adults in the city 
approved of the president's use of repressive measures 
to restore order. 
Thus, it would seem that continued support 
for the mystique of the Mexican Revolution and a strong 
presidency have ameliorated some of the destabilizing 
effects of urbanization that have operated in other 
Latin American countries. 
Socio-economic Dualism 
Income inequality is only one aspect of the 
dualism that exists in Mexican society. This dualism 
could undermine the support for the egalitarian ideology 
of the Revolution. Income statistics show that dualism 
exists to a great extent in the rural-urban quality 
of life. In 1963 the major metropolitan areas of Mexico 
City, Guadalajara and Monterrey with 16 percent of the 
population received 34 percent of the income. Only 
25 percent of the income went to the 45 percent of the 
population who lived on farms or in villages of under 
2,500. 23 The income of the urban workers on the average 
was four times greater than that of their counterparts 
in the rural population. 
The urban-rural dualism is also reflected 
in nutritional standards, unemployment and educat~on. 
A 1973 study shows that the majority of the 55 percent 
of the Mexican population who are malnourished live 
in rural areas. Of the 40 percent of the population 
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that was unemployed or underemployed in 1970, over two-thirds 
were workers from the rural areas. 24 In relation to 
education, an Eleven-Year Plan (1950-1970) was adopted 
by Lopez Mateos. It was successful in increasing the 
number of students that attended school but did not 
address the problems of rural education. By 1970, 54 
percent of the urban children remained in school to 
complete their elementary education. Only 9 percent 
of the rural school children remained in school long 
enough to receive even this level of literacy. 
Increased Demands for Political Participation 
In a sense the pressures created by urbanization 
and socio-economic dualism have contributed to a their 
source of tension which is a greater demand.for political 
participation. Demonstrations againsTthe government 
have been relatively rare in Mexico when compared to 
other Latin American countries. This is understandable 
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when one considers that the government, itself, is a 
revolutionary one based, at least ideologically, on 
egalitarian principles. Also, the office of the president 
has commanded such respect that the presesident has 
almost never been criticized even in the press. To 
the masses, the president has served almost as a father 
figure. The one-party system also has escaped serious 
attack becase the PR! has had such a broad base and 
the leadership has been responsive to the demands of 
the citizens. 25 
During the late 1960s and 1970s, however, 
severe strains developed in the Mexican political system. 
In 1968, just prior to the holding of the Olympic Games 
in Mexico City, approximately 4,000 people gathered 
in the Plaza of the Three Cultures to hear speeches. 
The subject of the speeches was a criticism of the government 
for spending millions of dollars to stage the Olympics 
while millions of Mexicans lived in grinding poverty. 
The rally ended in what has been dramatically described 
as a "massacre," with reports of the number of casualties 
ranging from 50 to 500 students. A 1971 incident involved 
the use of a paramilitary group known as Los Halcones 
(The Falcons) on a group of students who were protesting 
the continued incarceration of some of the demonstrators 
from the 1968 incident. The ensuing "scandal was so 
46 
open that President Echevarria had to ask for the resignation 
of several high-ranking officials including cabinet 
ministers and the Mayor of the Federal District. 1126 
The base of dissent broadened in the six years 
following the riots in the Plaza of the Three Cultures. 
"A wave of alienation swept the country involving not 
only the younger generation but also the adult middle 
class, intellectuals, and trade unionists. And b~ 1976, 
even the traditionally docile peasantry was resorting 
to violence and political acts of guerilla warfare. 1127 
These expressions of dissatisfaction were accompanied 
by an economic crisis that brought about galloping inflation, 
the devaluation of the peso and the transfer of capital 
to foreign investments. To deal with these emergencies, 
President Echeverria undertook certain reforms and offered 
concessions that actually itensified the problems that 
faced his successor, Jose Lopez Portillo. He announced 
a policy of "shared development" and attempted to rebuild 
popular support through costly wage, price, housing 
and investment programs. To meet the demands of the 
poor, Compania Nacional de Subsistencias Populares (CONASUPO) 
was formed. This was a food distribution system ~n 
which the government purchased staple-goods and made 
them available at lower prices to low-income families 
through shopping centers and mobile vending stores. 28 
These programs required an enormous outlay 
of public funds, increased the national deficit and 
the foreign debt. By 1975, federal expenditures had 
increased from 3.2 billion in 1970 to over 12 billion, 
the deficit rose from $500 million to $3.3 billion, 
and the balance of payments deficit rose from $1 billion 
to over $3.5 billion. 29 When Portillo took office in 
December of 1976 the country had an external debt of 
over $20 billion and an inflation rate of 30 percent. 
Portillo's program for restoring legitimacy 
to the system contained three parts: general amnesty 
for political offenses; administrative reform and a 
program of political reform known as reforma politica. 
The purpose of the latter part of the program was ''to 
co-opt the principal opposition forces into the system 
and to reopen the channels of political participation. 1130 
The new election law of 1977 increased the size of the 
Chamber of Deputies to 400. Three hundred of the members 
would be elected from single member districts throughout 
the country. The remaining 100 seats were guaranteed 
to opposition parties on a proportional basis. The 
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elections of July 1, 1979, were the first held under 
the new law. The PR! won 296 of the single-member seats. 
The strongest opposition party, National Action Party 
(NAP), won 3 of the single-member district seats and 
39 of the proportional seats. The remaining 61 seats 
were distributed among eight other parties. 31 
External Factors Affecting Stability 
Perhaps the most difficult problems with which 
Mexican presidents have had to deal are those rel~ted 
to industrial development and the penetration of the 
economic system by foreign investments. Presidents 
have constantly had to shift from economic policies 
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that favor national independence to those that encourage 
foreign investment when the flow of direct foreign investments 
began to diminish. Their dilemma has been an exercise 
in balancing the Revolutionary ideology of independence 
from foreign economic and political domination with 
the hard realities of developing an economic policy 
for a country heavily dependent upon foreign trade, 
capital and technology. 
Mexico has been able to build a diversified, 
sophisticated and intermediately complete industrial 
economy in large measure on the basis of direct foreign 
investment. 32 This investment has been responsible 
for the fact that Mexico no longer resembles the model 
of a "peripheral" country. It is too industrialized, 
its exports are too diversified, Mexican industries 
supply the country with too large a share of finished 
goods that are consumed domestically, and additionally 
Mexico is an unusually strong country politically with 
a sophisticated administrative structure that is capable 
of defending local interests. 
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On the other hand, however, Mexico has many 
problems to overcome before it can move from its dependent 
development or semi-peripheral status to that of a developed 
country. Economic development must focus on rais~ng 
the GNP, equalizing income, reducing dependence on foreign 
investment and developing technology rather than being 
dependent upon foreign sources. 33 
Mexico's economic development has not been 
achieved without some political costs in the form of 
loss of independence and frustration of public welfare 
objectives. As was indicated previously, the foreign 
manipulation of the availability of investment capital 
can influence a president's domestic policy options. 
In December of 1958, shortly after taking office, Lopez 
Mateos announced that he intended "to govern on the 
extreme left of the Constitution. 1134 Within days over 
$250 million in capital from the private sector left 
the country for investment in the United States. The 
president was forced to abandon his policy. Again in 
1960-1961, Mateos advocated changes that would limit 
the role of direct foreign investment. Foreign ciapital 
again fled the country. Devaluation of the peso ~nd 
sluggish economic growth resulted. 
Direct foreign investments dropped during 
the administration of Luis Echeverria (1970-1976) as 
a result of his policy of favoring the interest of the 
local bourgeoisie. In 1973 a "Mexicanization" law was 
passed which required that at least 51 percent of certain 
industries be owned by Mexicans. Mexicanization had 
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the effect of a two-edged sword. The reduction in foreign 
investments forced Echeverria to turn to international 
lending institutions for investment capital, thus increasing 
the country's foreign debt. Lopez Portillo, who followed 
Echeverria in office, had to shift his economic policy 
to restore investor confidence and end the serious recession 
brought on by the policies of Echeverria. Gereffi sums 
up the dilemma faced by the presidents as follows: 
"From Cardenas in the 1930s to the initial years of 
Lopez Mateos' regime to the Echeverria period, the flow 
of DFI to Mexico declined immediately whenever a president 
sounded too nationalistic or too concerned with the 
problems of labor or the poor. 1135 
The suggestion of dependency theorists that 
direct foreign investment through multinational corporations 
can divert government attention from social welf~re 
programs would, at least in the case of Mexico, seem 
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to be confirmed by Gereffi's statement. Other dependency 
propositions state that multinational corporations actually 
drain the periphery of capital, that major sources of 
capital are domestic rather than foreign, that multinational 
corporations create unemployment by using capital intensive 
rather than labor intensive technology and that they 
contribute to increasing income inequality. These positions 
would seem to be supported by evidence so far as the 
Mexican economy is concerned. 
Statistics show that in the 1940-1960 period 
foreign investors took more capital out of Mexico than 
they invested. The trend has continued. "In this decade 
alone, foreign investors, on new direct investments 
of $886 million, made an income of almost $1.7 billion, 
of which they reinvested less than 20 percent in Mexico. 
This 'suction pump' effect of foreign investment taking 
capital out of Mexico, combined with increased foreign 
credits, declining conditions of trade, periodic flight 
of capital and accumulated underdevelopment, has led 
to Mexico's progressive indebtedness, economic dependence 
and what Gonzalez Casanova has correctly termed 'decapitalization."13 
A problem that parallels that of decapitalization 
is the use of domestic capital by MNCs to finance their 
investments. Dependency theorists suggest·that the 
multinationals are less risky creditors than local firms 
and are, therfore, unable to secure loans that might 
otherwise go to domestic capital investors. Cockcroft 
indicates that this is the case in Mexico. "Unitled 
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States corporations finance 70 percent of their ihvestments 
with Mexican capital, make their profit on cheap Mexican 
labor, sell their goods for exorbitant prices directly 
in Mexico or abroad through the Latin American Free 
Trade Association (LAFTA) or the Central American Common 
Market, and remit the bulk of their profits to the United 
States. 1137 
Foreign subsidiaries account for a dominant 
share of the economic output in Mexico. .During the 
period of the 1960s and 1970s, multinationals produced 
67 percent of the output in the chemical industry, 63 
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percent of the electrical machinery and 84 percent of 
the output in the rubber industry. It has been argued 
that since MNCs have the tendency to be capital intensive, 
they do little to create jobs and actually create unemployment. 
In Mexico, MNCs have been found to be about 2.5 times 
as capital intensive as local firms. 38 
Muller contends that even though multinationals 
contribute to unemployment, the role they play in income 
maldistribution is more critical. "In Mexico in the 
early 1960s the ratio of individual income of the richest 
20 percent to the individual income of the poorest 20 
percent was 10 to 1. By the middle of the 1960s the 
ratio had increased to 17 to 1. 1139 The situation of 
income inequality was even greater in the Mexico City 
area where most of the MNCs are located. There the 
richest 30 percent receive 62.5 percent of the income 
while the poorest 20 percent have 1.3 percent of the 
income on which to live. 1140 
The Current Economic Crisis 
The economic crisis that Mexico is currently 
weathering is the most serious test of the stability 
of the political system in recent decades. In the wake 
of the discovery of huge oil reserves, the Portillo 
administration launched an ambitious plan for rapid 
development. The plan called for heavy borrowing to 
finance the development of oil resources, industrial 
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growth and expanded services for the poor, thus committing 
future income from oil exports to repay the loans. 
When the oil glut developed in 1981-1982 and income 
dropped, the government was faced with the need to borrow 
additional money just to pay the interest on the estimated 
80 billion dollar foreign debt. 
The severe financial crisis and the exposing 
of widespread corruption in the Portillo administration 
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put the new president, Miguel de la .Madrid, in an unenviable 
position when he took over the office in December of 
1982. The annual gross domestic product which had grown 
at the rate of 8 percent from 1979 to 1981 fell to no 
growth at all in 1982. In 1983, during the height of 
the crisis, growth actually declined about 3.5 percent. 
Unemployment or underemployment was estimated to be 
about 50 percent of the work force. The real income 
of those that were employed fell by 16 percent and Mexicans' 
buying power has dropped by 50 percent since 1982. 41 
The austerity measures imposed by the president 
and indirectly by international lending institutions 
as a precondition for further loans were severe. "Medicine 
prescribed was as strong as it has proved effective: 
drastic cuts in public spending and wages bravely held 
well under the inflation rate. In no other country 
in modern times, not even post-Weimar Germany, has so 
radical a program been instituted with such success. 1142 
De la Madrid halved the budget deficit which 
in 1982 was 18 percent of the gross national product. 
The inflation rate of 100 percent in 1982 had been reduced 
to about 75 percent by January of 1984 and was expected 
to be reduced to 50 percent by the end of the year. 
Imports were cut in half and the government had a healthy 
surplus of $12 billion at the beginning of 1984. 
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Observers have expressed amazement that the 
crisis, although not solved, has been reduced to manageable 
proportions. Even greater amazement has been expressed 
that President da la Madrid has accomplished this with 
so little cost to his political standing. "For the 
most part, Mexicans have accepted their new leade.r 's 
message for lower expectations. The country's mo:st 
powerful unions have been unusually docile. They agreed 
to a moderate 15 percent increase in minimum wage earlier 
this year and seem willing to settle for 25 to 30 percent 
increase in January. 1143 
Conclusions 
For many years students of Mexican politics 
have questioned the saliency of the Revolutionary ideology, 
the dominance of the president and the one-party system 
as factors in continued political stability. About 
20 years ago, Raymond Vernon predicted the break-up 
of the ruling party over economic circumstances that 
closely parallel those of the present time. 44 Martin 
Needler, writing in 1961, stated, "with all its advantages--by 
comparison with what went before in Mexico, with what 
would probably have occurred in Mexico without it, with 
what has taken place elsewhere in Latin America--the 
one-party system, admirably suited though it has been 
to the politics of this transitional period in Mexican 
life, is most likely itself a transitional form. 1145 
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Neither break-up nor transition have occurred. 
The PR! still continues to have massive support perhaps 
out of fear of a return to political instability ~r 
because of the traditional respect for authority. While 
it is true that Mexico is currently facing the worst 
economic crisis since before World War II, there is 
little reason to believe that a change in the party 
system would solve the problems. The major theme of 
opposition is corruption within the PR! and this can 
be temporarily silenced by a change in leadership. 
The current president has pledged to wage a vigorous 
campaign against corruption as one of the major objectives 
of his administration. 46 
The Revolution itself has come under attack 
~ 
by writers who contend that the Mexican people no, longer 
believe that the Revolution has accomplished its goals. 
Those that take this position point to political favoritism, 
graft and corruption, the 37 percent illiteracy rate, 
the highly unequal distribution of wealth and the 1 poor 
health and nutritional standards that give Mexico a 
higher crude death rate than Bolivia and Peru. 47 
On the other hand, the accomplishments of 
the Revolution seem to be impressive. Totalitarianism 
has been avoided, the land power structure has been 
broken and extensive agrarian reform has been achieved, 
and perhaps most importantly, order and stability in 
government have been maintained. It would seem that 
the goals of the Revolution are still the goals of the 
Mexican people and there is no evidence that the unifying 
effect of the Revolution has diminished. The people 
accept the fact that a great deal has been accomplished 
and that there is still a long way to go. 
There is also little evidence that the power 
of the president as a force in maintaining political 
stability has diminished. It is true, however, that 
the president increasingly finds himself performing 
a balancing act between the interest groups affiliated 
with the PR!. He is caught in the paradox of possessing 
great power, but at the same time in order to retain 
this power he must act with moderation and maintain 
a balance between the competing interest of the PR! 
coalition. 
As the government activities expand to meet 
the needs of an industrially developing nation, :the 
president is finding his power usurped by a growing 
bureaucracy. Vernon sees the president acting ~s a 
virtual rubber stamp for the bureaucracy. 48 Although 
these factors may limit the president's ability to act 
decisively, they do not damage the institutionalized 
nature of the presidency. 
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Robert Monson has stated that "Instability 
is brought about by a population that considers the 
political system to be illegitimate and/or ineffective, 
and by political institutions which cannot meet the 
needs and demands of the society and which lack the 
capacity to adjust. 1149 From the evidence presented, 
it would seem that the Mexican political system does 
indeed have the capacity to adjust, that its legitimacy 
has not been seriously'questioned and that it has shown 
a responsiveness to the needs and demands of society. 
The factors that have produced stability in the past 
should continue to do so in the future, even in the 
face of the current economic crisis. 
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III. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN ARGENTINA 
Argentina was as ill prepared for the task 
of nation-building as was Mexico when separation from 
Spain was achieved. The independence movement began 
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when the city council of Buenos Aires removed the Spanish 
viceroy and took control of the area in 1810. A declaration 
of independence, however, was not issued until six years 
later. Already conflict had developed between those 
who had commercial interests in Buenos Aires and controlled 
the flow of goods through the Rio de la Plata estuary 
and the caudillos who controlled the provinces of the 
interior. The focal point of this conflict was what 
form the new government should take. The caudillos 
supported a federal government thinking that this form 
would afford them the best opportunity to maintain autonomy 
over their provinces. The portenos (residents of Buenos 
Aires), on the other hand, wanted a unitary system to 
protect their economic interest and provide at least 
semblance of national unity to curb the power of the 
caudillos. 
A constitution, written in 1819, was to have 
united the country under a federal form of government, 
but Buenos Aires refused to participate and followed 
an independent course for seven years. Another constitution 
was written in 1926 which created the United Provinces 
of the Rio. de la Plata under a ,unitary form of government. 
Bernardino Rivadavia was chosen to serve as president, 
but this time the caudillos rebelled and once again 
national unity was not achieved. Juan Manuel Rosas, 
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one of the strongest provincial caudillos, and his private 
army restored order after the fall of Rivadavia. In 
1835 he began a period of dictatorial rule that lasted 
until he was overthrown by Justo Jose de Uriquiza, the 
caudillo from Entre Rios. 
Uriquiza called a constitutional convention 
in 1852. The document approved at that meeting was 
patterned largely after the United States Constitution 
and has remained in force ever since with the exception 
of a brief period from 1949 to 1955 during the presidency 
of Juan Peron. 
The new constitution, however, did not bring 
stability, and civil war broke out again in 1858 and 
1861. For Argentina order began to emerge from chaos 
when Bartolome Mitre was elected president, and Buenos 
Aires rejoined the Union, "and the next several decades 
were characterized by peace and stability and by rapid 
economic and political development. 1 
The government that produced this development 
was tightly controlled by the traditional oligarchy; 
the political bosses, importers and wealthy cattlemen 
from both Buenos Aires and the interior. For the most 
part these were good and able men who obeyed the constitution 
which provided for a degree of democracy. The citizens 
of Argentina enjoyed some civil and political rights 
but were largely excluded from meaningful participation 
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in the political process. "Governmental machinery revolved 
around the person of the president. In the provinces, 
legislatures were usually subservient to governors, 
who in turn were almost personal agents of the president. 112 
The oligarchs of this first conservative era 
(1862-1916) made significant progress toward modernization. 
First, and perhaps most importantly, they unified the 
country under a federal system. The conflict between 
Buenos Aires and the interior ended. The Indians were 
forced from the pampas and the region was turned over 
to the production of cattle and grain on a massive scale. 
The oligarchy realized that Argentina needed 
to develop industry as well as agriculture. To this 
end they encouraged foreign investment to develop a 
network of railroads and telegraph lines and promoted 
immigration to meet the increased demand for labor. 
Success in the latter endeavor was immediate and has 
had a far reaching impact on Argentina's development. 
The 1914 census showed that 30 percent of the population 
was foreign-born. For the city of Buenos Aires, immigrants 
comprised more than 50 percent of the population. 3 Most 
of the newcomers eventually settled in the urban centers 
of the country and created a growing urban middle-class 
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of small manufacturers and merchants. "By 1914 immigrants 
were in a majority among homeowners in Buenos Aires 
and as owners of small industries and commercial firms. 114 
These immigrants did not place many demands on the political 
system, nor did they agitate for political participation. 
For the most part they showed little interest in oolitics, 
having brought with them a low level of political culture. 
Nevertheless, because of their numbers and concentration 
in urban centers, they did have an impact on the system. 
"Argentine immigration posed a unique threat to political 
development through overnight creation of urbanization. 115 
These changes, industrialization and immigration, 
encouraged by the modernizing conservatives were major 
factors contributing to their fall from power in 1916. 
"Argentina's ruling oligarchy found that the coercion 
of the 19th century did not work. The primary exporting 
economy had developed a complex, pluralist society in 
the urban centers whose interests, aspirations, and 
class affiliations sometimes conflicted with those of 
the ruling oligarchy. 116 
However, the conservative's control of government 
was not challenged until 1890 when the Radical Civic 
Union (UCR) party was formed under the leadership of 
the popular and charismatic politician, Hipolito Yrigoyen. -
The Radical's platform called for expanded suffrage, 
an end to corruption and greater representation of urban 
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interests. In an effort to curb the tensions generated 
by the opposition party, the conservatives sought a 
compromise that would satisfy the demands of the middle 
class, but still not compromise the power of the landed 
aristocracy. 
Liberalizing the System 
Such a compromise was achieved by Roque Saenz 
Pena, an upper-class reformer, who was elected president 
in 1910. He sponsored an electoral reform bill which 
opened up the political system to include active participation 
by a larger segment of the middle class. The secret 
ballot was introduced, honest voter registration was 
held, voting became compulsory and suffrage was extended 
to all males over the age of 18. As might be expected, 
voter participation increased dramatically from 190,000 
in 1910 to 640,000 in 1912 and 1.46 million in 1928. 7 
These reforms allowed for a more competitive two party 
! 
system and paved the way for Yrigoyen's election to 
the presidency in 1916. 
The Saenz Pena law also established the "incomplete 
list" system of electing congressmen and presidential 
electors. A voter was required to cast a vote for two-thirds 
of the candidates on the ballot for each office. Those 
candidates with the most votes were elected regardless 
of party. "This law did not favor strong party discipline 
and allowed many parties to gain congressional representation. 118 
Many optimistic political observers at ~he 
time felt that the election of Yrigoyen and the change 
of governmental control from the Conservatives to the 
Radicals was a positive step toward political development 
and political modernization. Without revolution br 
civil war, the political system had responded to demands 
for change and the base of political participation had 
expanded. 
But history has not validated their optimism. 
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Argentina was indeed at a critical junction in its political 
development, a position similar to that of Mexico after 
the Revolution. However, instead of moving on to develop 
political institutions and procedures, Argentina began 
a process of political decay. The Radicals should bear 
a great deal of the responsibility for pointing Argentina 
in that direction. "The Yrigoyen administration was 
an orgy of spoils politics for the benefit of the Radical 
faithful who had worked and waited so long for their 
chance to participate in the public bounty, and many 
less educated Radicals took the places of more educated 
Conservatives. 119 The Radicals did not have a program 
to accomplish the "national renovation" that had been 
their slogan for the past several decades. "Yrigoyen 
led not a movement of ideas, but a personal following, 
and his Radicals wanted chiefly to use power for their 
material benefit. 1110 
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Marcelo Alvear succeeded Yrigoyen as oresident 
and served from 1922 to 1928. Some Radicals feltl, however, 
that Alvear was only a puppet manipulated by Yrigoyen 
from behind the scenes. This disregard for the institutional 
integrity of the presidency on the part of the former 
president led to a split of the Radical party into two 
factions, the personalistas (supporters of Yrigoyen) 
and the anit-personalistas. Yrigoyen was elected to 
the presidency again in 1928 and served until he was 
overthrown by a military coup d etat in 1930. 
On the surface, the fourteen years of Radical 
government seemed to be a period of substantial progress. 
~ 
The country had achieved high levels of economic development, 
literacy, urbanization and social mobilization. 
The greatest success story in Latin America 
prior to 1930 was Argentina. In the 1920s, 
Argentina was roughly at the same economic 
level as Canada and Australia and not far 
behind the United States. With a high degree 
of urbanization, a largely European population 
with many recent immigrants and a record for 
steady progress toward liberal democratic 
instituions, Argentina looked to the future 
with utmost confidence. Having near complete 
literacy and an excellent press, the Argentines 
were among the most cultivated of people, 
leading the world (Sweden and the United States 
following) in the num£rr of school teachers 
per 1,000 population. 
During this period of growth and expansion, 
the Radicals reaped the benefits of a primary exporting 
economy during a period of general prosperity, but failed 
to address any of the needs of structural changes in 
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government and society that developed along with modernization. 
In addition to ignoring institution-building in government, 
the Radicals had no programs for land reform, aid for 
the rural poor and made no effort to reduce income inequality 
between Buenos Aires and the interior or to improve 
working conditions for urban laborers. 
The End of the Democratic Experiment 
The depression brought an end to the prosperity 
of the Radical era and an end to their popularity. 
"People looked beneath the surface and discovered that 
the Radicals had not contributed significantly to extending 
political participation to the middle class that it 
was supposed to represent. 1112 The military coup of 
1930 was a response to this disillusionment with the 
Radicals, to the economic crisis created by the d~sappearance 
' 
of foreign markets and credit, to the widespread ~orruption 
in Yrigoyen's administration and to his alleged senility 
and inability to govern. 13 
In retrospect, the coup seems to have been 
another pivotal point in Argentina's political development. 
The coup" ..• has baffled many observers because it 
contradicts some cherished precepts in contemporary 
social science. Whereas most theorists envision democratic 
government at the culmination of political development, 
Argentina passed through a democratic period then moved 
on to dictatorial forms. 1114 The coup seems to have 
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established a pattern of "institutionalized" instability. 
Only in 1922 and 1928 have democratically elected1 presidents 
I 
completed their term of office. Military coups have 
removed civilian governments in 1930, 1943, 1955, 1962, 
1966 and 1973. In the words of Marvin Goldwert, "Until 
1930, Argentina was one of the great hopes for stable 
democracy in Latin America .... But the revolution of 
1930 unleashed the scourges of modern militarism and 
chronic instability in the land. 1115 
General Jose Uriburu led the coup of 1930 
and headed the government until Augustin Justo successfully 
challenged his authority and had himself elected president 
in 1932. Justo favored the economic interest of the 
conservative rural elite and in response to their pressure 
signed the Roco-Runciman Pact with Great Britain. In 
effect this agreement gave British investors control 
of public utilities and transportation as well as the 
meat packing industry. In return for this, Argentina 
received a pledge that in the midst of the depression 
Great Britain would not reduce its purchases of Argentine 
beef. Not only did the agreement clearly favor the 
cattle producers over the industrialists and middle 
sectors of the economy, but it also was a serious blow 
to those who favored a nationalistic economic policy 
since it greatly increased Argentina's economic dependency 
on Great Britain. 
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Roberto M. Ortiz, a reformist conservative, 
was elected president in 1938. He reinstated free elections, 
but was able to accomplish little more because of ill 
health which forced his resignation after only two years 
in office. Ramon Castillo, his reactionary vice president, 
proceeded to undo the progress that had been made in 
reestablishing a more open political system and was 
overthrown by the military in 1943. 
The officers who supported the coup were motivated 
by two rather different factors. One group simply wanted 
to continue the political reforms of the Ortiz period 
but the other group was responding to a more complicated 
set of external circumstances. 
Argentina had thus far been able to avoid 
alignment with either the Axis or Allied powers in the 
World War. A group of officers, however, favored supporting 
the Axis alliance because they saw an Axis victory as 
a way for Argentina to break free from its economic 
dependency on Great Britain. They were concerned that 
if the conservatives continued in power after the 1944 
elections they would force an alliance with the Allies 
in order to protect their economic interests. 
Also, at this time another change was taking 
place in Argentina which would have a far reaching impact 
on the country's political development. During the 
1930s and the 1940s there was a wave of migration to 
the cities of truly incredible proportions. During 
the period from 1936 to 1947, the number of Argentines 
born in the provinces and who moved to metropolitan 
Buenos Aires was equivalent to about 40 percent of the 
population increase. "These great masses transported 
rapidly to the cities and changed from rural peons, 
craftsmen, or laboring personnel into industrial workers, 
acquired a political significance without at the same 
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time finding institutional channels necessary for their 
integration into the normal functioning of the democracy. 1116 
Political parties could have been channels for integration; 
however, as Peter Snow writes, "The structures, the 
programs, and the leaders of the existing political 
parties were not able (nor willing perhaps) to offer 
anything of value to the working class. 1117 The inability 
of any group to effectively incorporate this element 
into its midst left unattended a large element for potential 
instability. 
The Rise of Peron 
It was the urban working class that one of 
the leaders of the 1943 coup, Juan Domingo Peron, mobilized 
not as a political party or even as participants in 
normalized political processes but instead as a mob 
to further his own personal political ambitions. Peron 
served as under secretary of war in the military government 
but used his position as head of the Department of Labor 
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and Social Welfare to organize the urban working class. 
He won their allegiance by securing significant wage 
increases and benefits. He was instrumental in organizing 
new trade unions and in expanding others that supported 
his political ambitions. By October of 1945, Peron 
had sufficiently expanded and consolidated his political 
support to the point that he posed a threat to the stability 
of the military government. 
Because of this threat he was arrested on 
October 9th. A massive demonstration of hundreds of 
thousands of workers in front of the Casa Rosada (presidential 
residence) convinced General Edelmio Farrel to release 
Peron on October 17th. The following February he was 
elected president of Argentina and for the next decade 
determined Argentina's future with government that was 
increasingly authoritarian. "His government was a highly 
personal one lacking a true revolutionary faith for 
transforming the nation .... Peron divided the country 
into Peronist and anti-Peronist. Neither was strong 
enough to destroy the other, nor humble enough to live 
with the other. This situation literally ruined the 
country. 1118 
As president, Peron continued to do a great 
deal for the working class, both materially and psychologically. 
He modernized the social security system and increased 
i 
the number of workers covered by its benefits. Wwages 
and fringe benefits were increased at a rate much higher 
than the workers' productivity indicated would be wise 
to avoid inflationary pressures. 
Peron's economic policies, as well as his 
social programs for the workers, had disastrous effects 
on the economy. He followed a form of state capitalism 
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in which "private property was subordinated along~with 
indiv~dual rights to strict government control. 1119 Industrial 
expansion was to be financed through a scheme by which 
the government would purchase agricultural products 
for low prices and resell them on the world market at 
substantially higher prices. Production fell drastically. 
In response to pressures for a more nationalistic economic 
·policy, Peron purchased the foreign share of ownership 
in the railrods, telephone companies and in petroleum 
production. This move proved to be counter productive 
from an economic standpoint. Not only did the purchases 
use up precious foreign exchange, but also the enterprises 
were soon operating at a loss and needed government 
subsidies to keep them operating. 
As Peron's economic problems became more complex 
because of inflation, costly social programs, decreased 
production and dwindling foreign exchange, his rule 
became more repressive. He took over the upper-class 
newspapers and increased press censorship. Opposition 
members in congress were effectively silenced by a new 
law "which made it a crime for anyone to attack the 
leaders of government or their policies. 1120 Peron's 
increasing paranoia is evident in the 1953 Edict of 
Economic Safety. This law "made it a crime to cast 
doubt on the government's policies, or to spread rumors, 
or to fail to denounce anyone who did. 1121 As another 
act of spitfulness against the upper-class, Peron had 
a prestigious jockey club in Buenos Aires burned. 
Peron's fatal mistake, however, was his. attack 
on the Catholic Church. The first clash came in the 
field of education. Peron outlawed religious instruction 
and dictated the justicialismo, an attempt to deify 
Peron and the state, be made a required course in all 
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schools. He also closed the Catholic newspapers, arrested 
priests, forbade religious processions and, as the ultimate 
insult to the Church, legalized divorce and prostitution. 
In addition to losing support of the Church, 
Peron alienated other groups that had supported him 
in the 1946 election. In the early years of consolidating 
power he had won the grudging support of the military 
. 
by significantly increasing military expenditures. 
Officers had received huge pay increases and in many 
instances were paid higher salaries than officers of 
comparable rank in the United States. Also, during 
the period from 1943 to 1949 appropriations for military 
procurements increased 1000 percent. 22 However, by 
1953 the economic condition of the country was so weak 
that Peron could no longer afford to buy the support 
of the military and its budget was greatly reduced. 
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Peron was also forced to abandon his nationalistic 
economic policies that had won support for him in the 
past. Foreign investment was encouraged and a contract 
was signed that gave Standard Oil of California control 
over the petroleum industry. 
After several unsuccessful coup attempts, 
the army joined the navy in calling for Peron's resignation 
on September 16, 1955. Three days later Peron retired 
to a Paraguayan gunboat anchored in the harbor and left 
behind a sad state of affairs in Argentina. The economy 
was in shambles; public confidence in government was 
destroyed; legitimate governmental institutions and 
processes had been weakened; and the working class, 
aware of its potential political strength, had become 
accustomed to operating outside of the official governmental 
structure. 
The demise of Juan Peron did not mean an end 
to Peronism. He continued to direct his following from 
exile in various other Latin American countries and 
later from Madrid. The presidents who served during 
the period from 1955 until the return of Peron in 1973 
had little time to devote to the affairs of state after 
dealing with what had become known as the ''Peronist 
problem." The Peronists frustrated economic recovery 
and political development by their unwillingness to 
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accept austerity measures and by staging crippling strikes 
and turning to terrorism as a means of achieving their 
demands. 
Instability Ensues 
General Eduardo Lonardi became president immediately 
after the coup but was replaced after only 50 days because 
his methods of dealing with the Peronist agitators were 
not considered harsh enough. Pedro Aramburu dissolved 
the Peronist Party and outlawed any political activity 
on its behalf. These actions, however, did not weaken 
the Peronist movement. In fact, the repression served 
as a rallying point for the Peronists to challenge the 
legitimacy of the military government. In the elections 
of 1957 and 1960, the Peronists resorted to casting 
blank ballots which amounted to a higher percent of 
the total vote cast than those for any political party. 23 
In 1958 the government was returned to civilian 
control and Dr. Arturo Frondizi was elected president. 
His credibility was questioned because many people felt 
that he had struck a deal with the Peronists. In exchange 
for electoral support Frondizi was thought to have agreed 
to remove some of the restrictions on labor's political 
activities. Nevertheless, his years in office were 
a balancing act between the demands of the right wing 
army officers, the demands of a worsening economy and 
the constant agitation of the labor movement for higher 
wages and political participation. 
In the face of eroding political support, 
Frondizi legalized the Peronist party in time for them 
to participate in the 1962 congressional elections. 
This act resulted in a sweeping victory for the Peronists 
and the arrest of Frondizi in a military coup just nine 
days after the election. 
Jose Maria Guido, president of the senate, 
served as acting president for 18 months until Arturo 
Illia was elected. Unable to deal effectively with 
growing economic problems and labor unrest, Illia was 
replaced by General Juan Carlos Ongania in a military 
coup on June 28, 1966. He had no greater success than 
78 
his predecessor in dealing with the nation's economic 
problems or in stemming the rising tide of terrorist 
activity that had resulted in the assassination of former 
president Aramburu and the kidnapping of numerous diplomats 
and foreign businessmen. Ongania was forced to resign 
by the military leaders and General Alejandro Lanusse, 
the army commander-in-chief, to.ok over in 1970. "In 
order to resolve the institutional crisis and bring 
all sectors of the country into the decision-making 
process, the Lanusse government has proposed a Gran 
Acuerdo Nacional (Grand National Agreement, GAN). Lanusse 
envisioned this agreement as an avenue for diologue 
among the major political forces to arrive at a meeting 
of the minds to create a stable political environment 
for the country. 1124 The GAN was met with skepticism 
by the major parties. "Already frustrated and alienated, 
these groups tended to have a defeatist attitude toward 
programs intended to create national unity or accord 
among diverse, recalcitrant sectors. 1125 
Lanusse promised to return the government 
to civilian hands and hold elections in 1973 in which 
Peronists who had been allowed to return to Argentina, 
would be able to participate but in which Peron himself 
would not be allowed to be a candidate. Hector Campora, 
generally considered to be a stand-in for Peron, won 
the election but served only a brief period before he 
and his vice president resigned to pave the way for 
new elections in which Juan Peron would be a candidate. 
Writing at the time, David Rock stated that 
"Peronism has been rehabilitated to the point where 
Peron himself is widely regarded among groups for~erly 
i 
most bitterly opposed to him as Argentina's de Gaulle, 
a focus of hope for an escape from the past and for 
26 
a new era of stability and development." 
Peron, however, did not provide the stabilizing 
force that the country needed. He died of natural causes 
after a year in office and was succeeded by his wife 
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and vice president, Isabel Peron. Unable to restore 
order and under constant attack from waring factions 
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of the Peronist movement on the left and from the~military 
on the right, Isabel Peron was removed to the surprise 
of almost no one by the military on March 24, 1976. 
The military retained power until 1983 and 
in the years immediately following the coup seemed to 
be making some progress toward economic and political 
recovery. By 1979 the economy was growing at the rate 
of 7.3 percent a year and substantial amounts of capital 
were flowing back into the country and terrorist activity 
seemed to have been brought under control. The accomplishments, 
however, were greatly overshadowed by the repressive 
measures that were secretly used to deal with the terrorist 
problem. It has been estimated that the military and 
civilian paramilitary forces killed from 15,000 to 20,000 
people. 27 Of these about 80 percent were under the 
age of 30. To add to the military's problems public 
confidence in the economy declined in 1981 after many 
businesses declared bankruptcy. Capital fled the country 
and the value of the peso which had been 2000 to the 
dollar in 1980 fell to 24,00o. 28 
Perhaps in an attempt to divert the people's 
attention from these mounting domestic problems, President 
Leopoldo Galtieri announced a surprise attack on the 
Malvinas (Falkland) Islands on April 2, 1982. This 
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military action was met initially with widespread support 
from the Argentine people. Argentina had always maintained 
that the islands are a part of its national territory 
acquired from Spain at the time of independence. However, 
the British had occupied the islands since 1833 and 
this occupation had been considered an insult to Argentina's 
national honor. 
The military venture resulted in humiliating 
defeat for the government as well as the Argentine people. 
Galtieri was forced to resign and his replacement, Reymaldo 
Bignone, made the decision to turn the reigns of government 
back to civilians. 
Elections were held in 1983 and Raul Alfonsin 
of the revived Radical Civic Union Party won with 52 
percent of the vote. The most surprising outcome of 
the election was the relatively poor support shown for 
the Peronist candidate who polled only about 40 p~rcent 
29 
of the vote. If, as the election results would seem 
to indicate, Peronism as a political force in Argentina 
is waining, it offers great hope that Argentina might 
at last be able to overcome the paralysis that has virtually 
stopped political development. 
This survey of the political history of Argentina 
demonstrates the tragedy that can result when a country's 
political development fails to keep pace with the demands 
of economic development and modernization. The situation 
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is perhaps more tragic because in the early decades 
of the twentieth century Argentina's future seemed so 
bright. Even today Argentina does not have to deal 
with many of the staggering problems that face developing 
countries. Argentina has a relatively homogeneous population 
and has always had one of the highest literacy rates 
in Latin America. Although there are disparities in 
income, they are not significantly different from those 
found in the United States, Italy or West Germany. 30 
Argentina is not plagued with the problems that accompany 
rapid population growth. The current population growth 
rate is 1.3 percent and has been steadily declining 
for the past 50 years. 
The reversal of development in Argentina is 
dramatically illustrated by David Rock. 
Argentina is today to many observers a pale 
shadow of what she was in the past. Unitl 
at least the First World War she was generally 
regarded as being capable of repeating in 
Latin America the phenomenal expansion of 
the United States. Now she is more frequently 
seen as just another bankrupt and stagnant, 
weak and exploited corner of South America, 
compelled to exist in the future as she now 
has done for so long in the P~!t, in a maelstrom 
of disorganization and decay. 
Consensus and Legitimacy 
The remainder of this chapter will be devoted 
to a closer examination of the aspects of Argentina's 
political history that have contributed most to this 
disorganization and decay. 
Many students of Argentine politics, both 
native and foreign, contend that the roots of instability 
can be found in the absence of a consensus or a sense 
of community in Argentine society. Domingo Sarmiento, 
the first statesman to rule Argentina after the legal 
unification of the nation in 1861, noted at that time 
that "The public good is a meaningless word--there is 
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no public. 1132 Lars Schoultz argues in his book, The 
Populist Challenge, that political instability has its 
roots in a largely unresolved conflict between two opposing 
views of the appropriate social structure for Argentina. 
The conflict is most often expressed in the opposing 
economic policies of liberalism and national populism. 
"Liberals advocate an economic system open and repponsive 
to international influences, while national populists 
argue for policies that favor native entrepreneuers 
and a relatively high level of economic autonomy. 1133 
Schoulitz argues that a consensus must be established 
before Argentina can extricate itself from the paralysis 
that affects its political system. "As it has for the 
past four decades, Argentina lacks a basic consensus 
on the type of society Argentines should attempt to 
construct. Absent this agreement, the nation has lurched 
uncertainly through most of the twentieth century, and 
it will undoubtedly continue to do so until it reaches 
a consensus on goals that are both economically feasible 
and politically acceptable to a broad segment of the 
Argentine people. 1134 
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Another ingredient held to be essential in 
political development is legitimacy. According to theory, 
for a government to be legitimate, it must be considered 
the most appropriate for meeting the goals of society, 
must follow established norms of political behavior 
and must have the capacity to deal effectively with 
change. Generally speaking, the legitimacy of every 
government since the Radicals came to power in 1916 
has been questioned by some politically significant 
group in Argentine society. 
The first crisis of legitimacy occurred in 
Yrigoyen's second administration and was one of the 
major reasons for the coup of 1930. "All traditional 
rules of Argentina's political game had been seriously 
violated, particularly after 1928. The Radicals' steady 
accretion of votes destroyed any balance of power. 
Intense partisan struggle replaced fluid party allegiances . 
... Understandably, in view of their expectations, conservatives 
came to see democracy as dysfunctional and therefore 
illegitimate. 1135 
In a sense the military has perpetuated; the 
legitimacy problem each time that it has stepped in 
to impose a solution to a crisis rathr than allowing 
the problems to be dealt with by the institutions of 
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government that would normally be responsible for conflict 
resolution. Some political scientists arguing in defense 
of the military state that the military has been the 
only institution in Argentina with the capacity to deal 
with conflict. 
However, another and perhaps more accurate 
view is that the incessant, internacine discord among 
various factions of the armed forces made them a very 
ineffective force for conflict resolution. "The armed 
forces' inability to agree among themselves on how to 
use their decisive power has been a major source of 
the instability that has characterized Argentine political 
life most of the time since 1930. 1136 
The Failure of the Institutionalization 
In addition to lacking consensus and legitimacy, 
Argentina also has failed to develop political institutions 
or processes that are strong enough to deal with the 
demands of a complex economic and social system. This 
lack of institutionalization is most evident in the 
presidency and in the functioning of political parties. 
The office of the president as a center of 
institutional authority has never developed in the Argentine 
political system. Executive power has rested more with 
the man holding the office than the authority of the 
position itself. There have been no presidents who, 
when it counted, put the interest of the nation above 
their own personal political ambitions. 
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Hipolito Yrigoyen, the first of the democratically 
elected presidents, was in a position much like that 
of George Washington and Lazaro Cardinas when they assumed 
the presidency of their respective countries. His administration 
could have established certain norms and procedures 
that would have led to the institutionalization of the 
presidency as a focal point for stability. He chose 
instead to follow the old style of caudillo politics. 
Years later, Juan Peron had the opportunity 
to restore institutional integrity to the presidency. 
However, he chose not to be the leader of the Argentine 
people, but rather to be the idol of the working class 
and to manipulate them to free himself from the constitutional 
limitations of the presidency and to assume near dictatorial 
powers. 
A traditional role of political parties in 
the political process has been interest aggregation 
and articulation. Parties serve as institutionalized 
channels through which citizens can press their demands 
on the government. Theoretically, in a system that 
functions well the political parties are either sufficient 
in number or broad in scope to articulate the demands 
of all politically active groups in society. It is 
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in this respect that Argentine parties have repeatedly 
failed to fulfill their institutional role. 
As we indicated previously, the Radicals remained 
a narrowly based party and failed to incorporate the 
middle class as a group into its ranks. The Rad~cal 
Party was more of a "great people" party than a "great 
idea" party and revolved too much around the personalist 
leadership of Yrigoyen. 37 
Peter Snow addresses this problem in his discussion 
of Argentine political parties and their response to 
urban migration that occurred in the 1930s and 1940s. 
"Unfortunately, the nation's political institutions 
were not equipped to handle large, new groups of political 
participants. The structure, the programs and the leaders 
of existing parties were not able (nor willing, perhaps) 
« 
to offer anything of value to the working class. 1138 
Even when Peron organized the workers into what from 
time to time was referred to as the Peronist Party, 
it was not a party in the traditional sense. The party 
"functioned primarily as a vehicle for mobilizing the 
working class support for the regime; it did not, in 
fact, participate in the governing of Argentina. 1139 
Duff and McCanant also point out the failure of parties 
to meet their interest aggregation responsibilities. 
" ... no party has been able to integrate the major sectors 
of the country and today the Peronist labor groups remain 
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as much out of the system as they did before Peron organized 
th 1140 em. 
Snow has identified the major defects of the 
party system as a lack of national parties, the failure 
of the party system to legitimate the government, inability 
to incorporate the Peronist movement into the party 
structure and the inability to meet the crisis of increased 
participation. 41 In summarizing the contribution of 
political parties, he says, "Historically, parties have 
played a major role in the political development of 
the nation, yet at the same time they must assume a 
major share of the blame for the chronic instability 
that has plagued the nation since 1930. 1142 
The Role of the Military 
A fourth influence that must share responsibility 
for political instability in Argentina is the military. 
The pervasiveness of its involvement in politics is 
evident from the preceeding discussion of Argentina's 
political history, but to more accurately assess the 
impact of its involvement on political instability, 
it is helpful to look at its development as an institution, 
to identify the political roles that it has played and 
to examine the factors that motivated the military to 
replace constitutional governments. 
The considerable influence that the military 
has had on the course of Argentine politics is a direct 
result of the process of professionalization that began 
during the first Conservative era from 1862 to 1916 
and the process of politicization that began in the 
1890s. Bartolome Mitre nationalized the war ministry 
as a first stop in transforming the military into a 
professional force. Sarmiento continued the process 
by creating the Colegio Militar in 1869 and the Escuela 
Naval in 1872. During the presidency of Roca a war 
college for senior officers was established, and in 
1901 compulsory military training was mandated with 
a system of promotions based on merit. By the first 
decades of the twentieth century, Argentina had well 
educated and highly trained officers primarily from 
the middle class who considered service in the armed 
forces as a professional career. 43 
The process of politicization has had a greater 
impact on the military and on political development 
of Argentina. Paul Lewis has identified three periods 
in the increasing involvement of the armed forces in 
politics. The first involvement was on a rather limited 
scale in the 1890s when the Radicals tried to enlist 
the support of the army officers in revolts against 
the Conservatives in 1893 and 1905. When the Radicals 
came to power in 1916, Yrigoyen continued to politicize 
the armed forces by restoring rank to those who had 
lost it as a result of their support of the revolts 
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in 1893 and 1905. The president caused greater dissension 
in the ranks by using his power to grant promotions 
as rewards to those officers who were supportive ~f 
his regime. During this phase of politicization political 
parties sought to use the force of the military as a 
catalyst to bring about political change but gave no 
consideration to sharing power with the military. 
In the 1940s the military began to assume 
a more overt political role. They took the initiative 
in the 1943 coup without civilian backing. 
The third phase of politicization began in 
1966 when the military took firm control of the government 
and asserted its right to rule alone, abolishing political 
parties and greatly demobilizing political participation. 
While operating in its political role, the 
military has served in many capacities. Initially, 
the military operated as a pressure group in the first 
Radical era and as a partner in government with Peron 
and the labor movement. During the Frondizi administration 
the military increased its influence in politics by 
demanding that its leaders be allowed to exercise veto 
power over major policy decisions of the administration. 
However, the most drastic step taken by the military 
in exercising its political power has been to overthrow 
constitutional governments and establish military governments. 
Acting in this capacity the military has caused the 
greatest harm to the political system. The reasons 
for these extra-legal seizures of power are important 
in an assessment of the military's responsibility for 
the lack of political stability. 
While it is often assumed that the armed forces 
seize control of governments "to retain the status quo 
and to prevent any meaningful reform, 1144 the causes 
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for intervention identified by Snow in the case of Argentina 
would seem to contradict this position. 
Instead, it appears that the major causes 
of Argentina's 'revolutions' have been: 1. 
the meddling of civilian governments in the 
internal affairs of the military; 2. popular 
dissatisfaction with civilian administrations; 
3. a desire to change the very nature of the 
political system; and 4. in recent years, 
a deep-seated anti-Peronist attitude on' 4ge 
part of the leaders of the armed forces. 
In attempting to assess the responsibility 
of the military for the political instability, it is 
important to note that at no time did the armed forces 
overthrow a healthy, well functioning democratic government. 
Their action has been in response to an actual or perceived 
crisis. However, their "quick fix" approach to dealing 
with institutional and economic crises has prevented 
a process of incremental change that would have led 
to the development of stable institutions and an established 
political process. Because of its overt political role, 
the military has been an effective roadblock to the 
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legitimation of government and the process of institutionalization 
that has been its stated objectives when taking over 
after deposing civilian governments. 
External Factors 
The impact on political stability of factors 
external to the national system of Argentina has been 
varied, subtle and difficult to measure. An analysis 
of political history, however, reveals three groups 
of pressures from external sources that have affected 
the stability of domestic politics: 1) Pressures resulting 
from economic dependence on Great Britain until after 
World War II; 2) Pressures from the United States and 
other Latin American countries to join the Allied forces 
in World War II; 3) Pressures from the United States 
and certain international organizations to follow certain 
norms in observing human rights. 
The pattern of economic development chosen 
by the modernizing Conservatives in the nineteenth century 
produced a reasonably good standard of living for most 
people in Argentina but greatly limited the political 
maneuverability of succeeding administrations. "Argentina's 
status before the Second World War as a dependent primary 
producer linked to overseas trade was the most vital 
factor impinging upon her social and political development. 1146 
Argentina flourished so long as the world economy was 
healthy and her primary trading partner, Great Britain, 
continued to purchase large quantities of grain and 
beef. But because Argentina's development strategy 
centered around the export of raw materials and the 
importation of consumer and capital goods, the economic 
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well being of the nation was at the mercy of the international 
market. 
An example of the impact that the dependent 
state of Argentina's economy had on administrative decisions 
occurred during the Agustin Justo administration discussed 
earlier in this paper. In negotiating the Roco-Runciman 
Pact, Justo was forced to favor certain sectors of the 
economy. The increased dependency on Great Britain 
served as a rallying point for political opponents. 
Until after World War II succeeding administrations 
were constantly shifting back and forth between policies 
that favored foreign investment and those that limited it. 
Since World War II it would seem that Argentina 
has lessened its dependency on Great Britain and has 
been somewhat immune to economic penetration by the 
United States, primarily because of its geographical 
distance. In the 1960s only 2 percent of the government's 
income was from customs revenues, and by the late 1970s 
only 6 percent of investment capital came from foreign 
sources. 47 " ... Argentina's complex international economic 
relations cannot be characterized as consisting of a 
one-sided dependence. ,AB 
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Thus, it would seem that Argentina is not 
as vulnerable as Mexico to economic manipulation for 
several reasons. At the present time Argentina has 
a foreign debt of about 43 billion dollars compared 
to Mexico's 83 billion. Although Argentina has experienced 
some difficulty in making interest payments and in repaying 
the principal, the government has resisted demands of 
the International Monetary Fund to impose austerity 
programs to reduce government spending. "Instead, Argentina 
wants to 'grow' its way out of the crisis. Government 
planners say that unlike Mexico and Brazil, which have 
had to swallow bitter austerity.medicine as part of 
their agreements with their creditors, Argentina's economy 
is basically healthy--despite its fevered inflation. 
It traditionally exports more than it imports. The 
Alfonsin team insists that it can cut the budget deficit 
and bring down inflation without contracting the economy. 
With economic management and political order, it argues, 
the economy will grow and the debt will be paid. The 
implication is that otherwise Alfonsin will never last 
and the banks can kiss their $43 billion goodbye. 1149 
Argentina's political stability was thr0 atened 
by the not so subtle pressures of the United States 
for Argentina to declare war on the Axis powers in World 
War II. Public opinion in Argentina was divided. Certain 
segments of the military were supportive of the fascist 
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government in Italy and some, such as Juan Peron, had 
received military training in Italy and Germany. Others 
supported the Axis powers for economic reasons as indicated 
previously. They hoped that the defeat of Great Britain 
would release Argentina from Britain's economic control. 
Still other groups in Argentina favored joining ~ith 
the Allied powers as an expression of hemispheric solidarity. 
The issue of the position Argentina should take in World 
War II was a contributing factor to the military coup 
that occurred June 4, 1943, and external pressures played 
a role in that decision as discussed by Michael Francis. 
"It is necessary to discuss the internal nature of the 
forces that produced the coup because in this instance, 
even more than in most such cases, international events 
became intermeshed with domestic political considerations 
until the two were no longer separable. This is not 
to imply that the events of June 4 were caused by pressures 
outside Argentina. They were shaped by international 
forces but certainly not caused by them. 1150 
A third and more recent instance in which 
external pressures placed stains on the stability of 
the military government came during the Carter presidency. 
Reports of repressive measures used by the military 
to combat terrorism in the late 1970s prompted the Carter 
administration to stop arms shipments to Argentina and 
to reduce military aid from $34 million to less than 
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$1 million. The impact of this action on the government 
of Argentina has received mixed reviews. Some feel 
that it was a contributing factor to the fall of the 
military government. Emilio Mignone, the head of Argentina's 
leading human rights group, has been quoted as saying, 
"Carter's policy had enormous influence. It saved lives 
and helped create the conditions for the restoration 
of democracy. 1151 Other writers contend that the measures 
taken by Carter were not particularly successful in 
bringing about a change in policy because arms and aid 
were readily available elsewhere. 52 
Thus, it would appear from this limited but 
fairly representative survey of external influences 
on domestic politics that external factors have not 
played a major role in the political instability of 
Argentina. Indeed, foreign interference sometimes produces 
results that are very different from those desired, 
as is indicated by Joseph Tulchin in the case of the 
United States. 
The United States government persistently 
pressured the Argentine government first to 
cooperate more enthusiastically in the war 
effort and, after 1945, to conform more closely 
to the accepted norms of democratic behavior. 
Repeatedly, this pressure had the unintended 
effect of undermining the political factions 
most sympathetic to the United States and 
strengthening the faction that was most national-
istic, more antiliberal, and less friendly 
to the United States. In other words, United 
States interference in Argentine domestic 
affairs then had the effect, and has had the 
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effect over and over again, of pushing the 
government further to the right and further 
toward xenophobic nationalism and away from 53 
reasonable interaction with the United States. 
Summary 
Argentina's political instability has resulted 
primarily from the inability of its political institutions 
to respond to the growing pressures of economic development, 
rapid political mobilization and urbanization. Two 
factors have been primarily responsible for weakness 
of Argentina's political institutions. The first of 
these factors is the military. Its role in politics 
has been much more destabilizing than in any other country 
in this study. Repeated intervention has interrupted 
the evolutionary process of institutional development. 
Another factor has been the prevalence of personalism 
in Argentine politics. Peronism in particular injected 
an element of personalism that led to a polarization 
of political forces that had the effect of retarding 
political development for decades. 
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IV. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN CHILE 
Chile offers an interesting contrast to both 
Mexico and Argentina in its political development. 
Whereas Mexico developed a stable political system 
only after almost a century of political upheaval 
and a civil war that took millions of lives and Argentina 
has yet to experience stability, Chile's history has 
seen only minor eruptions of political discontent. 
In 1973, however, the tradition of stability was broken, 
and today Chile's prospects for a stable future are 
even more dismal than Argentina's. 
Following a brief survey of Chile's political 
history, this chapter will focus on the foundations 
of Chile's political stability and those factors which 
brought it to such a violent end in 1973. Special 
attention will be given to.the Frei and Allende administrations 
and to the role of the United States government and 
international agencies in bringing an end to Chilean 
democracy. 
Chile emerged from its war of independence 
free from Spanish control but with the colonial social 
structure essentially intact. Quite naturally the 
military, flush with the prestige of the successful 
revolution and having the organizational structure 
already in place, took a dominant role in organizing 
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the government. Bernard O'Higgins, a distinguished 
war hero, headed the legally constituted but autocratic 
government from 1817-1823. He sensed the need to 
bring about certain reforms in the social structure 
as a prerequisite to creating a true republic. However, 
his efforts to achieve reform were met with strong 
opposition. He resigned the presidency rather than 
allow the confrontation to lead the country into civil 
war. 
His resignation precipitated the formation 
of two groups that would eventually evolve into Chile's 
first political parties. 
One favored a real republic, free and democratic, 
and the liberalization of social institutions 
accordingly, regardless of the lack of traditions 
in political habits; the other demanded a strong 
centralized government, as opposed to the federali-
zation advocated by its opponents, and aspired, 
in general, to a system which would not break 
completely with traditions, one which in short 
would not be dif ferent 1 from the one maintained 
under Spanish control. 
Perhaps O'Higgins' magnanimous gesture of 
resignation saved Chile from a civil war such as Mexico 
experienced in its revolution of 1910, but it allowed 
Chile to postpone coming to terms with an important 
ingredient for political stability--that of reaching 
a consensus on the basic goals of society and the 
direction that the government should take. 
The problem of forming a consensus became 
rather moot with the inauguration of the Autocratic 
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Republic (1830-1871). In 1830 after several years 
of political upheaval, Diego Portales created a governing 
institution based upon the "authority of the Executive 
and impersonality, and regularity of procedures, and 
legitimacy. 112 
The three presidents that followed Portales' 
prescription brought stability and order to Chile. 
In this respect, Chile was unique among the former 
Spanish colonies. Failure to break with colonial 
social institutions made Chile the most politically 
stable country in Latin America, but at the same time 
it was the most socially backward. 
The power that the presidents of the Autocratic 
Republic enjoyed was somewhat weakened during the 
Liberal Republic (1871-1890). Presidents during this 
period found the support of political parties in congress 
a necessity for effective government. Presidential 
power was almost totally extinguished by a civil war 
that erupted in 1891. The confrontation pitted the 
president, Jose' Manuel Balmaceda, and certain members 
of the Chilean aristocracy against the congress and 
its supporters over the question of whether a presidential 
or parliamentary system of government should prevail. 
The defeat of Balmaceda ushered in the Parliamentary 
Regime (1891-1925) during which time presidential 
104 
authority all but disappeared and political parties 
increased in power and number. 
This period of time also saw many changes 
in economic and social development. The failure of 
the political parties to respond to these changes 
led to the collapse of the oligarchy in 1920. According 
to Gill, 
Change had come swiftly--an industrial revolution 
and social upheaval hand-in-hand--the machine, 
the proletariat, the metropolis, and the intellectual 
middle class appeared almost simultaneously on 
the scene. While these changes were in the making, 
parties remained alien to the social revolution. 
They were imposing structures without substance, 
too absorbed in political machinations and petty 
rivalri3s to grasp the significance of the transfor-
mation. 
Not only did the parties fail to address themselves 
to societal and economic needs during the parliamentary 
period, but they also failed to address the need for 
institution building in government. 
Government in Chile reached a very low point 
during the period of parliamentary rule. Ministerial 
instability could be expected to increase with the 
implementation of a parliamentary system; however, 
it reached truly epidemic proportions. In the 55 
years prior to 1886, 31 cabinets had headed Chilean 
government. In the 33 years of parliamentary rule, 
there were 121 different cabinets composed of over 
530 ministers. 4 
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Contrary to previous norms of electoral behavior, 
vote-buying became an accepted practice during the 
parliamentary period. After 1891, public office was 
open only to those who could afford to spend the considerable 
sums of money which were necessary for getting elected 
to office. Gil suggests that 
For the sake of prestige, seats in Congress were 
bought by wealthy aristocrats in the same way 
that their ancestors had purchased titles of 
nobility. Civic spirit and patriotism seemed 
lost, and the masses submitted to the congressional 
oligarchy with the same resignation with which 
they had accepted presidential absolutism after 
1830, apparently indifferent to the neglect of 
the national interest and to adm~nistrative ineffi-
ciency and political corruption. 
By the 1920 presidential election, however, 
Chilean society could no longer be described as consisting 
of the ruling elite at the top making all of the decisions 
and the submissive masses waiting patiently on the 
political fringe. Public opinion had been stimulated 
by economic growth and trade union activities. New 
segments of the society were demanding fundamental 
changes in government and a redistribution of power. 
The problem of developing a consensus on the direction 
of Chilean political development that was postponed 
with the resignation of O'Higgins surfaced again as 
a major issue in 1920. "The campaign ... developed 
chiefly as a struggle between partisans for stability 
in the prevailing order and those who favored profound 
social and political change--a 'new system', as Arturo 
Alessandri, their candidate, called it. 116 
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Alessandri won by a slim margin and the Tribunal 
of Honor, the body that selected presidents in the 
event that no candidate received a majority, presented 
him with the presidency. Once in office, however, 
translating the public will as demonstrated by his 
election into public policy was no easy task. His 
proposals for social security, direct election of 
the president, separation of church and state, administrative 
decentralization and abolition of the parliamentary 
system met with firm opposition in the Senate. This 
opposition produced an impasse that was due in part 
to poor economic conditions as well as a recalcitrant 
congress and continued even after the congressional 
elections of 1924 gave Alessandri a majority in both 
houses. 
An unusual series of events occurred late 
in 1924 that overshadowed in importance the passage 
of Alessandri's reforms. The scenario started with 
congress voting itself a pay increase in violation 
of the constitution instead of dealing with the urgently 
needed proposals. The military in its first intervention 
in politics in over a century intimidated congress 
into approving within a short period of time all of 
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the social legislation over which it had been languishing 
for years. Alessandri, realizing that legitimacy 
of his government had been abridged by the actions 
of the military, left the country the same day. 
A military junta was formed which dissolved 
congress and ruled for five months until it was replaced 
by a clique within the armed forces. This group recalled 
Alessandri, who, now free from an obstructionist congress, 
ruled by decree to enact the social and economic reforms 
that he had championed in his 1920 campaign. 
Perhaps the major accomplishment of Alessandri's 
brief period in office was constitutional reform. 
Although the constitution contained some provisions 
that would lead to greater stability--a strong executive 
to replace the parliamentary system--it contained 
three provisions in particular that had great potential 
for institutionalized instability. The first of these 
provisions established a system of proportional representation 
in congress which led to a proliferation of political 
parties. The large numbers of parties represented 
in congress, as well as their competitiveness, has 
often caused immobility in legislative action at times 
when a crisis called for swift and decisive action. 
Such an impasse occurred during the administrations 
of Eduardo Frei (1964-1970) and Salvador Allende (1970-
73) and was one of the contributing factors to the 
breakdown in Chilean democracy. 
A second provision of the constitution with 
potential for instability was the power of congress 
to choose presidents when no candidate received a 
majority of the popular vote. With the large number 
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of fairly competitive parties, this happened frequently. 
In fact the election of 1964 is the only one in which 
a president ever won an absolute majority. 
The third feature of the new constitution 
which contributed to instability was a separation 
of the dates for presidential and congressional elections. 
This meant that swings in public opinion could put 
into office presidents and legislators who were hostile 
to each other's programs. 
The first decade under the new constitution 
was probably the most politically unstable period 
in Chile's history. Emiliano Figuera Larrain was 
elected president in 1925 but was ousted by Carlos 
Ibanez who set up a dictatorship that lasted for four 
years. Unable to quell civil disturbances or reverse 
the sharp economic depression, Ibanez resigned in 
July of 1931. During the next fifteen months, Chile 
experienced nine different governments, two general 
strikes and a naval revolt. 7 The most unique of the 
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nine governments was the short-lived Chilean Socialist 
Republic formed by Colonel Marmaduke Grove. The election 
of 1932 marked the beginning of the much heralded 
period of stablity in Chile which set it apart from 
other countries in South America. The reasons for 
this stability have been discussed by many scholars 
interested in Chilean political development. 
Coups d' etat and military rule, common in other 
Latin American countries, have been almost completely 
absent in Chile since the 1930's. From that 
date Chilean elites have been able to fashion 
a viable set of institutions which permitted 
the vast majority of Chilean presidents to serve 
out their terms and make way for their duly elected 
successors .... That process was facilitated 
by the fact that Chilean elite did not divide 
sharply along social and economic lines. Both 
the traditional landed elites and new mining 
and commerical interests sgared a similar stake 
in Chile's export economy. 
In addition to a common interest shared by 
the political elites, Chile's stability also rested 
on a spirit of compromise between the government and 
opposition parties. 9 "Not only did the Chileans enjoy 
greater political stability than most Latin American 
countries after 1932, but they did so using an uhusually 
sophisticated multi-party system. It was a system, 
however, that was controlled effectively by upper-class 
and middle-sector parties, which tolerated working-class 
opposition only so long as their interests were not 
threatened. When the working-class parties did get 
out of line, they were outlawed, as was the communist 
party in 1947 and 1958. 1110 
James Petras also attributes Chile's polltical 
stablility to compromise and accommodation. "Chronic 
economic problems of slow growth and a rigid social 
system have been managed through a delicate system 
of political transactions involving established parties 
and interest groups. This arrangement created the 
conditions for Chilean political stability. 1111 
Two problems are rather immediately evident 
from the preceding discussion of stability. First, 
Chile's political stability was not derived from the 
functioning of institutions but from a tacit agreement 
between the government and opposition that bargaining 
and compromise were necessary for them to maintain 
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their control. Secondly, a large segment of the population, 
the urban working class and the peasantry, were excluded 
from the bargaining process. This fragile stability 
lasted as long as the electorate remained small and 
the lower classes were not mobilized. 
But this situation was not to last long. 
The period of industrial expansion from 1940 to 1953 
produced a 40 percent rise in national income. The 
benefits were unevenly distributed to the different 
groups in Chilean society which led to a gradual process 
of greater economic, social and political polarization. 
During this period, the real income for proprietors 
and the self-employed rose over 60 percent, for the 
white collar workers an estimated 46 percent, but 
' 12 the real wages of manual workers rose only 7 percent. 
Before moving on to a discussion of the Frei 
and Allende administrations and the end to Chilean 
political stability, it is helpful to summarize the 
status of Chile's political development in relation 
to those factors identified as having been responsible 
for stability in Mexico. First, Chile still lacked 
a basic consensus on the most appropriate political 
system for the country. The legitimacy of the system 
had not to this point been seriously questioned because 
of the low level of political participation by t~e 
only groups that would question it. By the early 
1960s, Chile was ranked first in democratic stability 
among the Latin American countries but was ranked 
fourteenth in electoral participation. A voter turnout 
of 17.9 percent in the presidential election of 1958 
represented the high point in participation to that 
time. 13 
Also, in contrasting political development 
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in Chile and Mexico, Chile had developed an institutionalized 
process with a strong executive, but unlike Mexico 
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it also had an equally powerful legislature. Indeed, 
the Chilean legislature has been characterized as 
one of the strongest in the world. 14 What this meant 
in practical terms was that the institutional framework 
I 
contributed more to legislative immobilization and 
incremental political change. This system worked 
well so long as the demands on the system were not 
forceful or in urgent need of resolution. 
The political party structure in Chile was 
also very different from that in Mexico. The multiplicity 
of competitive parties did not provide the legitimizing 
and stabilizing function for the system as the PRI 
has done in Mexico. Burnett adddresses the problem 
that the multi-party system caused for Chile. 
Indeed, by the 1960's six major parties vied 
for control of the government and offered the 
Chilean voters numerous doctrinal alternatives. 
But if the contemporary party system now provided 
an openness and dynamism unparalleled in the 
history of the republic, the very plethora of 
partisan camps--and the societal cleavages they 
mirrowed--also introduced immobilist features 
into the decision-making process that created 
uncertainty about the viability of government 
in its existing form and about the social an~5 
economic directions the nation would pursue. 
The election of Eduardo Frei in 1964 did indeed 
forecast new directions for Chile. The Christian 
Democrat's program for a "revolution in liberty" called 
for electoral reforms, expanding suffrage to illiterates, 
limiting campaign expenditures, and measures to combat 
"conflict of interest" in public administration. 
To eliminate some of the problems of immobility in 
the legislative process, Christian Democrats wanted 
to simplify the legislature, strengthen the power 
of the executive by allowing the president to submit 
bills to a national referendum when congress failed 
to act on them. In the economic field Frei advocated 
an increase in the state's control over the economy, 
including the Chileanization of the copper industry. 
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For the masses who had so long been ignored by government 
programs, the Christian Democrats proposed the construction 
of 60,000 houses annually for six years, agrarian 
reform to include the expropriation of large, inefficient 
land holdings as well a the unionization of peasants. 
These measures which were introduced within 
the first few months of taking office were bottled 
up in congress by forces of the far right and the 
far left. Frei was forced to withdraw them in the 
hope that the March 1965 congressional elections would 
give him the necessary votes to proceed with the reforms 
that the country so badly needed. The elections gave 
the Christian Democrats 42.3 percent of the vote and 
for the first time in many years a single party held 
a majority of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies. 
From its position of strength, the Christian 
Democrats began to assault many of the institutional 
obstacles to swift legislative action. 
On major issues, such as agrarian reform and 
copper nationalization, compromises were struck 
with opposing forces. However, on much of the 
day-to-day running of the government, with the 
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support of the majority in the Chamber, the government 
was able to undermine significantly the politics 
of clientelism .... Arguing against the incrementalism 
which had impeded reform, government technocrats 
sought to institute more "rational" planning 
schemes which would dispense with the "distortions" 
of the political process. Opposition parties 
and legislators were progressively excluded from 
many of the particularistic deals of the past. 
Congress lost some of its earl~er importance 
as an arena of accommodation. 
. 
The Frei administration also encouraged social 
mobilization as a means of gaining support for its 
programs. 
For the first time in our history the peasantry 
formed unions, cooperatives increased, and the 
number of workers in industrial labor unions 
doubled. Thanks to the work of the National 
Office of People's Development, a whole system 
of grass roots organizations came into being, 
including nei7hborhood associations and centers 
for mothers. 
This period of hyper mobilization encouraged 
by Christian Democrats resulted in significant increases 
in electoral mobilization. The electorate expanded 
from 1.25 million or 16 percent of the population 
in 1960 to 2.84 million or 28.3 percent in 1971. 
On the surface, the Christian Democratic party 
seemed to be making great progress in bringing reforms 
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in Chile. However, on closer examination, it would 
seem that they were rather unwittingly destroying 
the fragile underpinnings of the system that had produced 
the stability of the past. The partido unico or "single 
party" strategy of government to avoid the bargaining 
and clientism destroyed the institutional base upon 
which most scholars felt the stability of the system 
rested. Their strategy also intensified the polarization 
of the right and left as well as their efforts to 
prevent the center Christian Democrats from building 
a permanent majority. The parties of the right, the 
Conservatives and Liberals, formed a coalition party, 
the National Party. The left, on the other hand, 
i 
started a rigorous organizing compaign among the1 rural 
peasants as well as the urban working class. The 
Christian Democrats found their electoral base seriously 
eroded when the election of 1970 approached. 
A great deal of political maneuvering by forces 
both inside and outside of Chile accompanied the election 
of Salvador Allende, the first Marxist ever chosen 
in a democratic election. Allende was the candidate 
of the Unidad Popular (UP) or Popular Unity, a coalition 
of parties which included socialists and communists. 
Yet, he was obstructed in his efforts to bring socialism 
to Chile by a variety of forces: the institutional 
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inadequacies of the Chilean political system, unwise 
choices in implementing the socialist program and 
the overt and covert opposition of the United States. 
Allende had been a prominent figure in Chilean 
politics for many years and a candidate for the presidency 
in the three previous elections. In 1952 he was last 
in a four way race polling only 32,000 votes of the 
more than a million cast. By 1958, he had increased 
his support tremendously, receiving 356,493 votes 
to Jorge Alessandri's 389,909. Allende would almost 
assuredly have won that election had Antonio Zambrano, 
a defrocked priest from a small village near Santiago, 
not entered the race as an independent. He polled 
41,304 votes which it is reasonable to expect would 
have gone to Allende giving him a plurality, and considering 
congress's strong adherence to selecting the candidate 
with a plurality, Allende, not Alessandri would have 
been president. 
In 1964 Allende came in second again behind 
Eduardo Frei who had received over 3 million dollars 
from the Central Intelligence Agency and substantial 
sums from Christian Democratic parties in Europe and 
from private businesses. Valenzuela writes that 
The CIA also undertook to support the Frei effort 
by mounting a massive propaganda campaign. The 
campaign, referred to in Chile as a "campaign 
of terror," sought to depict the Allende candidacy 
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as one that would institute a repressive and 
bloody regime in which, among other things, children 
would be taken away from their mothers. There 
is little doubt that the vituperative propaganda 
contributed to the sharp rise 1~n conflict and 
mistrust in Chilean politics. 
Allende was able to overcome his political 
opposition in 1970 and won a plurality of the votes. 
There were several unsuccessful plots to encourage 
congress to break with tradition and appoint Jorge 
Alessandri. Alessandri had even pledged to resign 
if appointed to pave the way for new elections in 
which Eduardo Frei would have been an eligible candidate. 
This move would afford the center another opportunity 
to consolidate support and win a majority. 
During Allende's first year in office, important 
steps were taken along the "Chilean road to socialism." 
More industries were added to the public sectors, 
wages were increased for urban and farm workers, public 
housing provided shelter for significantly greater 
numbers of poor Chileans and social security programs 
were expanded to cover more workers. The economic 
situation looked promising. The 1971 gross geographical 
product increased 8 percent, industrial production 
was up 12 percent and overall consumption was up 13 
percent. Inflation which had always been a problem 
for the Chilean economy was held to 22 percent and 
19 the unemployment rate was down 50 percent. 
But these conditions were to be short lived, 
and the remaining two years of Allende's administration 
could be described as politically and economically 
chaotic. The most serious political problems centered 
around congress's refusal to approve constitutional 
legislation sanctioning the government's program of 
expropriation and nationalization which was essential 
to Allende's program. Matters reached an impasse 
when congress approved an amendment which would have 
subjected each act of expropriation or nationalization 
to congressional approval on an individual basis. 
Allende vetoed the amendment and contended that a 
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two-thirds vote of congress was necessary to override 
the veto. At this point both congress and the president 
focused their attention on the March elections in 
hopes that the results would be conclusive enough 
to break the impasse in their favor. 20 The opposition 
hoped to gain enough seats to impeach Allende while 
Allende himself hoped that a significant gain of seats 
in congress for the UP would serve as a plebiscite 
on his program. 
In the area of economics, the promising picture 
of 1971 reversed itself in 1972. The increased wages 
had created a demand for goods far beyond Chile's 
capacity to produce. It became necessary to import 
119 
huge quantities of food and other consumer goods. 
The program of nationalization brought domestic as 
well as foreign investment to a standstill and the 
h d 1 t 1 . . t 1 f . 21 government a to p ay a grea er ro e in cap1 a ormat1on. 
Foreign reserves were quickly used up and the foreign 
debt rose to over 4 billion dollars and represented 
at that time the largest per capita debt of any country 
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except Israel. Food shortages began to appear in 
1971 and inflation rose to 163 percent in 1973 and 
to 508 percent in 1973. 
The economy was destabilized not only by Allende's 
policies that were inflationary but also by strikes 
and an "economic blockade" carried out by the United 
States. The most disruptive strike was conducted 
by the truckers in October of 1972. The strike was 
initiated by independent owners in a remote southern 
province. It was joined by merchants, professionals, 
industrialists, white-collar workers, anti-Marxist 
peasants as well as the National and Christian Democratic 
parties. To one degree or another all of the parties 
involved participated in the strike in order to discredit 
Allende's government. Some wanted to shut down the 
economy in order to win concessions from the government 
while others wanted nothing short of the overthrow 
of Allende. 
The strike failed primarily because of popular 
mobil~zation and the support of the government by 
the military. The effects of the strike were weakened 
when workers began to take over and operate many of 
the factories that had been closed by the owners. 
Volunteer drivers using over 1,000 requisitioned trucks 
kept goods moving. The strike did succeed, however, 
in further polarizing society along class lines: 
The working classes supported the government while 
the upper and middle classes became an increasingly 
violent opposition. 
Because of these unsettled conditions in his 
country, Allende was forced more and more to turn 
to neutral forces for support of the government. 
One such neutral force was the military. The strike 
pressured Allende into making some changes in his 
cabinet. He brought three high-ranking officers of 
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the army into prominent positions. The most influential 
was Carlos Prats, a strong supporter of constitutionalism, 
who became Minister of the Interior. Within four 
days, the truckers' strike was settled. 
Scholars of Chilean politics and history are 
divided on the role that the military has played in 
Chilean society. Some writers contend that the military 
has always had an important political role. The fact 
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that there had been no coups d etat for the past 42 
years resulted more from the condition that the civilian 
governments did not threaten the position of the military 
than from its non-political nature. 23 
Burnett sees the lack of military involvement 
in politics as the result of "a long-honored arrangement 
whereby the military is assured a given percentage 
of the budget and goes about its own way. 1124 Frederick 
! 
contends that the military in Chile has been rather 
limited in its ability to influence political affairs 
unlike its counterpart in other Latin American countries 
because the civilian governments have functioned well 
and in accordance with the constitution. The civilian 
governments also used several techniques to check 
military ambitions. They kept the military contented 
with generous supplies of equipment and agreed to 
their demands as long as they were not excessive. 
The government supported anti-military press campaigns 
from time to time and gave unofficial sponsorship 
to a civilian militia. 25 
But regardless of the tradition of non-intervention 
in politics, the armed forces became increasingly 
divided on the issue as the economic and political 
situation worsened for the Allende administration. 
The decision to bring Prats into the government contributed 
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to the dissention within the military. It intensified 
the latent generational, service and political divisions 
within the military institutions. It tended to polarize 
the elements that abhorred the Popular Unity government 
and were becoming increasingly committed to its overthrow 
and the "constitutionalists" who approved of no action 
in violation of the constitution. 26 
The "bosses strike" of October 1972 brought 
more military officers into the government to fill 
positions in the bureaucracy as well as the cabinet. 
"Thus by September 1973, the Allende government was 
virtually a captive of the armed forces, which were 
or had been involved at all levels in the country's 
crisis as managers of enterprises, as bureaucrats 
in the national administration and as political leaders 
in the emergency zones and in the cabinet. 1127 
The anti-Allende forces gained the upper hand 
and the fate of Allende's government was sealed when 
Carlos Prats was forced to resign and was replaced 
by General Augusto Pinochet who assumed the positions 
of Commander-in-Chief and Minister of the Interior. 
The right-wing of the military had plotted 
a coup when Allende was elected. A small group conspired 
to kidnap General Rene Schneider, the Army Commander-in-Chief 
and blame it on the left. The plot failed, however, 
when General Schneider was accidentally killed and 
the right was discredited. The coup that ended Chile's 
socialist experiment came on September 11, 1973. 
While the coup was not unexpected, its violent nature 
was. Allende was killed in the intense bombardment 
of the presidential palace and hundreds of lives were 
lost in sporadic fighting throughout the capital city. 
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The role of the United States and multi-national 
corporations in the affairs of Chile during the Allende 
administration afford the opportunity to examine the 
variety of ways in which a "center" country can influence 
the stability of a "peripheral" one. The United States 
government perceived that a successful Marxist government 
in Chile would not only be detrimental to United States 
commercial interest in that country but also a political 
embarrassment. Having failed to prevent Allende's 
election, various efforts were made to promote his 
downfall. 
Chile's economy was very vulnerable to manipulation 
by the United States. The country imported about 
30 percent of its food, machinery and machine parts. 
Many of the parts could only be obtained in the United 
States. Copper was the country's basic export and 
the health of the Chilean economy depended heavily 
on the world price for this commodity. 28 
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By unanimous vote, the Chamber of Deputies, 
in which the Popular Unity government held a minority 
of the seats, supported the nationalization of the 
Anaconda and Kennecott copper mines in June of 1971. 
The government proposed to deduct from the compensation 
profits in excess of the 12 percent that was considered 
to be a fair return on an investment. Independent 
accountants found that the profits made by the American 
companies were excessive to the point that the companies 
29 
actually owed the Chilean government money. There 
is some evidence to support the contention that the 
profits were excessive. "The rich copper reserves 
of Chile, in just sixty years, had produced for U. 
S. copper corporations ... the equivalent of over half 
of Chile's total assets accumulated over the previous 
400 years. 1130 The profits of Anaconda and Kennecott 
exceeded the total book value of the companies by 
$774 million. 
In retaliation for the nationalization, the 
United States government, under pressure from the 
companies involved, initiated steps to economically 
destabilize the country. The United States vetoed 
Chile's application for loans from the Export-Import 
Bank (Eximbank) and multi-national lending institutions 
such as the World Bank and the Inter-American. The 
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Eximbank also suspended guarantees and insurance programs 
for commerical banks and exporters who in turn were 
forced to cut almost all short-term credits to Chile. 
This action resulted in a reduction of credits from 
$300 million in 1970 to $30 million in 1973. This 
"credit blockade" forced Chile to use up its foreign 
reserves. 
According to Collins, the impact of the "blockade" 
was devastating. By 1972 Chile's total imports had 
declined but most significantly imports from the: United 
States fell from 40 percent to about 15 percent. 
The lack of spare parts caused particular problems. 
"By early 1972, 30 percent of the privately owned 
microbuses and 21 percent of the taxicabs and 33 percent 
of state owned buses were immobilized because of the 
lack of parts. 1131 
Paul Sigmund does not feel that the cut off 
of credit was a significant factor in the mounting 
economic chaos in Chile. He emphasizes that loans 
were available from Canada and western Europe as well 
as from other Latin American countries and the Soviet 
Union. "In fact, on August 30, 1973, Allende had 
more short-term credits available to him ($574 million) 
than at the time of his election ($310 million). 1132 
If this was indeed the case, it is unclear why imports 
fell so drastically, serious food shortages developed, 
and the country was forced to draw on its foreign 
reserves. 
In addition to pursuing a plan of economic 
destabilization, the United States through the Central 
Intelligence Agency supported activities to accelerate 
the economic crisis and encourage domestic opposition 
to Allende's government. CIA Director, William Colby, 
testified before the House Armed Services Subcommittee 
that the agency had been authorized to spend $8 million 
to finance the truckers strike and other activities 
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designed to destabilize the Allende government. Considering 
inflation and the black market value of the dollar, 
the impact of the money spent by the CIA was comparable 
to $40 to $50 million. 33 
Colby also testified that the Forty Committee 
of the National Security Council headed by Henry Kissinger 
authorized the CIA to spend covertly $400,000 in efforts 
to prevent Allende's election and later to spend $350,000 
to bribe Chilean congressmen to vote for Alessandri. 
Officials of the State Department conceded that the 
money had been authorized but contend that the latter 
funds were never spent. 34 
During subsequent questioning, Colby also 
revealed that the CIA had successfully infiltrated 
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all of the major political parties, the purpose being 
to encourage resistance to Allende's efforts to reach 
compromises with them on the issues that were immobilizing 
35 his government. Testimony also disclosed that the 
multi-national corporation ITT had offered the CIA 
one million dollars in 1970 to prevent Allende's election 
. 
and later submitted a comprehensive plan to bring 
about economic chaos in Chile. 36 
The CIA also engaged in activities designed 
to affect public opinion in the United States toward 
the Chilean government. Robert Clark refers to the 
Chilean situation in discussing the use of press reports 
to manipulate public opinion on foreign policy. 11 For 
example, prior to the fall of the government of Marxist 
Salvador Allende, the CIA sent a number of foreign 
reporters to Chile to bring back unfavorable material 
on the Allende regime to affect the opinion of influential 
political and business leaders in the United States. 1137 
To what extent did these actions by the United 
States contribute to the collapse of constitutional 
government in Chile? While it is expected that opinions 
would differ, Frederick Nunn offers what would seem 
to be a rather naive evaluation. 
It would be incorrect, however, to assume that 
economic sanctions, cutbacks in aid, grants and 
loans, and the expenditure of millions for harassment 
of the Chilean government caused that government's 
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demise. Such measures perpetuated certain difficulties 
and problems, but did not directly cause them. 
The golpe of September 11, 1973, was more a result 
of internal problems than 38xternal forces brought to bear through intrigue. 
It would seem more logical to conclude that the external 
forces exacerbated the internal problems to the point 
that it was impossible for the traditional bargaining 
procedures to solve them. 
Another area of possible influence by the 
United States in Chilean affairs was the military. 
i 
Throughout the Allende period, the United States1 maintained 
close relations with the military and in fact military 
aid was the only kind of aid that the United States 
gave to Chile from 1970 to 1973. In the final analysis 
it was the armed forces decision to break with tradition 
that led to the overthrow of the government. The 
United States military personnel in Chile were in 
an excellent position to influence that decision. 
Given the vigor with which the United States pursued 
economic destabilization, it is hardly logical to 
think that the United States would have refrained 
from using the situation to its advantage. 
The military with its promises to restore 
economic and political order was met initially with 
widespread acceptance by the Chilean people. The 
economic situation improved as aid, imported goods, 
and loans were again flowing into Chile. But as the 
years passed, it became painfully obvious to Chileans 
that money and power had corrupted the military. 
Promises to return the government to civilians were 
broken, congress was dissolved, brutal and repressive 
measures were taken against those of the far left, 
political parties were outlawed, and even the leaders 
of the centrist Christian Democratic party were exiled. 
Pinochet as leader of the junta has assumed 
dictatorial power and has taken steps to preserve 
his position. In 1980, a constitution designed to 
provide a measure of institutionalization for the 
ad hoc military regime was approved in a plebiscite. 
The constitution designated Pinochet as president 
for eight years and would allow the junta to reappoint 
him for an additional eight years. 39 
In the wake of a severe crisis in the Chilean 
economy and resentment over continued military rule, 
Chileans have resorted to mass demonstrations. The 
Pinochet government has responded with mass arrests 
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and detentions. The situation is described by a university 
student in Santiago in a letter to the author 
In Chile we are passing the worst moment of our 
history. We always had a democratic tradition, 
150 years of democracy .... Now we are suffering 
an external government, we have known what means 
repression, there are no liberty of opinion and 
information, a security police that arrest people 
and you never know about them anymore, while 
on the otherside there are many bombs, and people 
death [people's death the] product of communist 
terrorism ... Well, but we have faith that truth, 
justice ~Bd moderation will come back to our 
country. 
Summary 
But truth, justice and especially moderation 
might be a long time in coming to Chilean politics. 
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It is not reasonable to expect Pinochet and the military 
to relinquish power in the face of growing leftist 
terrorism and increasingly bold and open opposition 
from the middle class. At the same time, it is not 
likely that these groups will give up their agitation 
for return to civilian rule. 
This situation leads one to ponder what forces 
in Chile's political development were most.responsible 
for the current crisis and what steps might be taken 
to hasten the return of a more stable political environment. 
It would seem that the rapid social mobilization of 
urban workers and peasants initiated by Frei and continued 
by Allende placed strains on the political system 
to which it did not have the capacity or perhaps time 
to adjust. The rise of these new politically relevant 
groups challenged the old consensus upon which the 
stability of Chile had rested. The increasing rapid 
polarization prevented the formation of a revised 
consensus. This increased mobilization was also accompanied 
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by rising expectations for greater economic benefits. 
The steps taken by Allende to meet these expectations 
destabilized the economy almost to the point of collapse. 
Finally, the interference of the United States in 
the internal political affairs of Chile must share 
some of the responsibility for the current crisis. 
The programs of economic and political destabilization 
carried out by the United States provided just the 
force that was needed to topple an already fragile 
and shaky structure. 
If truth, justice and moderation are to return 
to Chilean politics, it is clear that there must first 
be a return to democratic government. This is not 
to imply that democracy and free elections will automatically 
produce stability. However, given the political tradition 
of Chile prior to 1973 and its experience with military 
dictatorship since that time, the legitimacy of any 
future government will have to be based on civilian, 
democratic rule. The new government will have to 
promote the formation of a political consensus that 
recognizes the need for the economic as well as political 
integration of all sectors of society. Institutions 
of government will have to be created and political 
processes developed that are dedicated to achieving 
this integration. 
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V. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN BRAZIL 
The colonial experience and independence movement 
in Brazil were significantly different from those of 
the Spanish colonies. The country was left in what 
would seem to have been a much more favorable position 
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for stable political development. Feelings of nationalism 
had developed early when the Brazilian forces were able 
to remove Dutch invaders in the 17th century. Nationalism 
was further stimulated when the King of Portugal, Don Joao, 
fled to Brazil to escape capture by Napoleon I in 1808. 
When Napoleon was defeated and Portugal again became 
independent, Don Joao reluctantly returned to the Portuguese 
throne in 1821. He left his son Dom Pedro to serve 
as regent in Brazil and gave him instructions that if 
an independence movement should start he should become 
a leader of that movement rather than risk losing all 
authority by opposing it. 
The Empire 
The opportunity to follow this advice was very 
short in coming. In 1822 the Portuguese Cortez demanded 
that Dom Pedro also return to Portugal. This he refused 
to do and on September 7, 1822, he declared Brazilian 
independence and was crowned emperor several months 
later. There was very little opposition to this move 
by the Portuguese in Brazil, thus Brazil was able to 
accomplish in 15 months what the rest of Latin America 
achieved in bloody civil wars after 15 years. 1 
Thus, Brazil started independence under rather 
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auspicious circumstances. "The presence of the Portuguese 
royal family meant that the transition would be peaceful 
and that the government of the independent state would 
represent continuity and stability instead of anarchy 
and civil war. 112 Perhaps the most important aspect 
of the peaceful transition was the fact that the military 
had played no role in independence and, thus, was not 
in a position to influence the new government as was 
the case in Chile and Argentina. It was not until after 
the Paraguan war (1865-1870) that the Brazilian military 
began to have political ambitions. 
Pedro I drafted a constitution that provided for 
an elected lower house of the legislature but left a 
great deal of power for the emperor in the form of poder 
moderador (moderating power). Discontent grew over 
the emperor's use of his extensive power and he was 
faced with rebellion in several of the provinces. His 
suppression of these uprisings served only to widen 
the conflict and he was faced to abdicate in April of 
1831 in favor of his son Dom Pedro II. Being only five 
years old at the time of his father's abdication, Dom 
Pedro II did not assume power until 1841 at the age 
of fifteen. 
Dom Pedro II ruled for 48 years with the assistance 
of disciplined, elite oriented, conservative and liberal 
parties which continually broadened their base of support 
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to include the developing middle class. The emperor, 
profiting from his father's mistakes, used his "moderating 
power" with much more restraint and allowed the parliamentary 
system to function without interference. The country 
enjoyed stability primarily because of the economic 
prosperity resulting from the export of sugar, cotton 
and rubber. Internal trade was stimulated by the construction 
of railroads and telegraph lines. 
Ironically, it was the success that Dom Pedro II 
had in bringing about social and economic changes that 
led to the legitimacy of the empire being questioned. 
Increased political participation led to the rise of 
republicanism in the 1880s. The movement was particularly 
successful among the younger generation of university 
educated sons of planters, merchants and professional 
men. The movement was also supported by the Brazilian 
positivists who held important positions on the faculties 
of the leading colleges, especially military colleges. 
Support for the monarchy was also eroded by a development 
that had its roots in the Paraguan war. During this 
war, the military had suffered heavy casualties as a 
result of poor equipment and the lack of adequate training. 
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The officers blamed the monarchy for this condition 
and saw increased political involvement as the only 
way to protect their interests. Frustration was also 
growing within the officer corps over the slowness of 
promotions. These frustrations eventually vented themselves 
in a military coup and the announcement proclaiming 
the Republic on November 15, 1889. Dom Pedro II and 
his family quietly left for exile in Portugal. 
The First Republic and the Growth of Regionalism 
The creation of the First Republic (1889-1930) 
and the adoption of the constitution which provided 
for a federal system of twenty states and a directly 
elected president appeared at first to be an important 
step toward political development and integration; however, 
this did not prove to be the case. The centrifugal 
forces of regionalism threatened to fractionalize the 
country. Stability was maintained only at the price 
of recognizing the legitimacy of the entrenched oligarchial 
regimes in each state. 3 The authority of the federal 
government was greatly compromised. The more economically 
prosperous states of Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais controlled 
a disproportional share of the political power. The 
presidency, which was the most coveted prize, was virtually 
rotated between these two powerful states except on 
those occasions when Rio Grande do Sul could tip the 
balance of power in favor of an alliance of small states. 
The system could not be expected to run smoothly, for 
as Paul Lewis indicates, "Where men might feel a greater 
sense of identification as minerios (Minas Gerais), 
paulistas (Sao Paulo), gauchos (Rio Grande do Sul), 
or cariocas (Rio de Janeiro), rather than Brazilians, 
the system is inherently unstable. 114 
During the First Republic regionalism was encouraged 
also by the tremendous size of the country and the lack 
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of roads and railroads to integrate the country. Regionalism 
remained a factor in Brazilian political instability 
until the election of Janie Quadros in 1960. In his 
bid for the presidency, he won a plurality of the vote 
in every one of the major states, a situation that has 
rarely happened in Brazilian elections. 
Regionalism also played a large part in bringing 
the First Republic to an end. The fragile balance of 
power that had been maintained by alternating the presidency 
between candidates from Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais fell 
apart in 1930 when the powerful states could not agree 
on a candidate and they were challenged by a coalition 
of smaller ones. When the official candidate Julio 
Prestes was declared the winner, charges of election 
fraud sparked a rebellion. The army, exercising its 
"moderating powers," nullified the election and called 
Getuleo Vargas, the opposition candidate from Rio Grande 
do Sul, to the presidency. 
The Vargas Era (1930-1945) 
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The 15 years of Vargas' rule left Brazil vastly 
different from what it had been in 1930. Many of his 
programs were designed to promote economic growth and 
industrialization as well as to strengthen the country's 
political institutions and processes. In terms of lasting 
results, he was far more successful with the former 
than the latter. 
Almost immediately after taking office, Vargas 
set about strengthening the central government and breaking 
the state government's hold on political power that 
had retarded political development. He reduced the 
size of the state militias and replaced the governors 
in all of the states except Minas Gerais with men who 
reported directly to him. This move greatly weakened 
the state political machines and reduced some of the 
destabilizing effects of regionalism. 5 
Vargas' efforts to create more viable political 
institutions centered around his desire to create a 
strong presidency. Presidential power was increased 
greatly during the Vargas era but little was done to 
institutionalize or depersonalize the office. The power 
that Vargas exercised was more a result of the force 
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of his personality and political ambitions. During 
the first years of his administration, he governed without 
a legislature and during the period of the Estado Novo, 
congress was again recessed and Vargas created a virtual 
dictatorship. 
Vargas used a great deal of political maneuvering 
to remain in power beyond the constitutional limits. 
After three years in office, he called a Constituent 
Assembly to write a new Constitution. One of the Assembly's 
most important acts was to elect Vargas as the first 
president with a four-year term. Before his term expired 
in 1938, Vargas, with the support of the military, proclaimed 
yet another constitution that created the Estado Novo 
with himself as dictator. From this position, it was 
a rather simple matter for Vargas to appoint himself 
to another four-year term. In 1943, Vargas explained 
that the emergency of war time precluded the holding 
of elections, and he remained in power until he was 
ousted by the military in October 1945. 
Gutelo Vargas' most lasting contribution was in 
industrial development. The world economic crises of 
1930 provided the stimulus for Brazil to begin import 
substitution industrial development. He encouraged 
the growth of domestic industry through a program of 
tariffs and subsidies that even included the investing 
of government capital in constructing the Volta Redonda 
steel mill. 
The efforts of his policies can be shown by compara-
tive statistics: during his rule the number of 
factories doubled, as did the number of workers 
engaged in industry, the output of hydroelectric 
]IJ 2 
power also doubled; the value of production quintupled; 
and the ~mount of capital investment rose by 1,000 
percent. 
The Estado Novo provided the centralized structure 
necessary for Vargas and his aides to work toward reorganization 
and economic development. The federal government assum{~d 
an prominent role in the economy, organizing and strengthening 
marketing cartels for coffee, cocoa, sugar, and tea, 
and creating new state enterprises, such as the National 
Motor Factory which produced trucks and airplane engines. 7 
Important changes were made in the bureaucracy. The 
old partonage-ridden system was replaced by one based 
on merit. Perhaps the most important area to receive 
Vargas' attention was the promulgation of laws regulating 
the activities of labor unions. One union was permitted 
to organize in each plant on a local basis. No statewide 
or nationwide unions were allowed. The labor ministry 
had control of union finances and election, thus in 
effect, tying unions to the government and greatly limiting 
their potential for organizing strikes and protests 
in opposition to government economic policy as was the 
case so frequently in Argentina. 
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In evaluating the contribution of Vargas' administration 
to the development of Brazil, it would seem that there 
was very little achievement in the area of political 
development. His flagrant manipulation of presidential 
succession, his personalist approach to politics and 
his low regard for the Legislative Assembly as an institution 
of government did little to develop an institutionalized 
political system that could provide continuity in Brazilian 
politics. By contrast, his contributions in the area 
of economic development were significant and ongoing 
even though at the time the effects were not felt outside 
of the few urban centers. 
Ironically, it was certain aspects of Vargas' economic 
policy that caused the polarization that--combined with 
other factors--resulted in military intervention and 
the end of his dictatorship. After the allied victory 
was assured in World War II, Vargas took a bold step 
by issuing a tough anti-monopoly decree that greatly 
restricted the role of foreign firms in the economy 
of Brazil. This was actually a sign of Vargas' shift 
to the left in response to a populist movement that 
had begun in Brazil in 1943. As further evidence of 
this shift, Vargas released leftist political prisoners 
and reduced police control of leftist political activities. 
These shifts in economic and political policy drew the 
ire of the United States government as well as many 
groups in Brazil who believed that foreign capital was 
essential for the growth of the economy. As the year 
progressed, the polarization of the anti-Vargas forces--
liberal constitutionalists; a large number of military 
officers; and most state political bosses and those 
that supported Vargas' policies; populists; some union 
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leaders, socialist and communist--increased. The confrontation 
reached a climax in October and Vargas accepted the 
military's action of declaring him deposed. 
The Second Republic (1945-1964) 
Vargas was replaced by General Eurico Dudra, a 
close associate of Vargas in planning the Estado Novo. 
However, instead of continuing the programs to promote 
industrial development, Dudra dropped them and returned 
to the exporting of coffee as Brazil's chief source 
of revenue. This again placed the Brazilian economy 
at the mercy of the world demand for coffee. 
In political matters Dudra moved to check the shift 
to the left that had begun several years earlier. The 
Communist Party had been legalized in 1946 and immediately 
began to show amazing strength in the unions of the 
major industrial centers. The government moved quickly 
to remove the leadership of hundreds of unions and to 
replace it with men more favorably inclined to follow 
government economic policy. 
Vargas' exit from politics was short lived. Within 
two months, he was elected to serve in the senate from 
the state of Rio Grande do Sul. From this position, 
he began to organize for a political comeback and was 
elected to the presidency in 1950 with a plurality of 
48.7 percent of the vote. 
Economic policy was given top priority in Vargas' 
third presidency, but problems on the domestic as well 
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as international fronts combined to frustrate his efforts. 
The rate of inflation nearly doubled from 1951 to 1952 
and a deficit appeared in Brazil's balance of foreign 
trade. In addition to these domestic problems, Vargas 
was faced with the possible cutoff of loan commitments 
for infrastructive development that had been negotiated 
with the United States. Dwight Eisenhower, taking office 
in 1952, was reluctant to continue the aid commitments 
of the Truman administration. 
These economic problems put Vargas in the untenable 
position of being able to please neither the right nor 
the left. Amid the rising tide of discontent over financial 
scandals that implicated Vargas' son, Vargas' fate was 
sealed when a plot to assassinate Carlos Lacerda, a 
journalist that led the anti-Vargas forces, was traced 
to the palace security chief. Lacerda was only slightly 
wounded in the attempt on his life but an air force 
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officer serving as his bodyguard was killed. Senior 
officers of the military demanded the president's resignation. 
This time Vargas chose to commit suicide rather than 
accede to their demands. 
Juscelino Kubitschek was elected president in 1955 
and set about mending the tears in the national fabric 
left by Vargas' administration and dramatic exit. He 
placated the military with new weapons and chose as 
minister of war a general who had a great deal of prestige 
among the officers. To divert the nation's attention 
from its problems Kubitschek played to a wave of nationalism 
with his "Target Program" for economic development that 
promised "fifty years of progress in five," and his 
ambitions to realize a longstanding Brazilian dream 
of building a new capital city in the interior of the 
8 
country. 
Brazilia, the new capital in the interior, was 
completed on time but at the cost of mortgaging Brazil's 
economic future to foreign creditors. The task of repaying 
the loans fell to the new president Janie Quadros who 
was elected in 1960. He immediately imposed a tough 
stabilization program which was met with a great deal 
of opposition. When congress refused to grant him additional 
powers with which to deal with the economic problems, 
he resigned after only seven months in office. 
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His resignation created a crisis of sorts. Confidence 
in the political system was shaken and the country div i d('d 
over the succession of Quadros' vice president, Joao 
Goulart. In the end the forces favoring constitutionalism 
prevailed when a compromise was reached that would allow 
Goulart to assume the presidency if congress would create 
a parliamentary system to reduce presidential power. 
"Goulart's presidency was ill-starred from the beginning. 
The odds were against him on almost every count, but 
he made them worse by his inexperience, weakness and 
. d . . "9 in ecision. An agreement was negotiated with the 
International Monetary Fund to deal with inflation and 
the balance of payments deficit. It called for a reduction 
in the government deficit, tough wage controls and a 
reduction in credit. The implementation of these measures 
alienated the very groups to which Goulart looked for 
his political support. For this reason he abandoned 
them after only a few months. 
Goulart was faced with other problems as well. 
From the time of his accession to the presidency certain 
elements within the military with the tacit support 
of United States government officials in Brazil had 
been quietly developing plans for his overthrow. These 
elements became convinced in early 1964 that Goulart 
was planning to seize control of the government with 
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the support of the workers and leftist political elements 
including the socialists and communists. To prevent 
this, a military coup was carried out on March 31. 
The support that Goulart had tried to raise never materialized 
and he went into exile. The military broke with tradition 
and took control of the government thus bringing an 
end to the Second Republic. 
The period from 1945 to 1964 was a period of democratic 
rule but one in which little progress was made in developing 
political institutions that would provide stability 
for the political system. One of the areas in which 
this was most evident was the political party system. 
Beginning in 1945, fourteen parties were legally registered, 
but only three were organized on a national basis. Two 
were formed by Vargas. The Partido Social Democratico 
(PSD) was made up of a variety of groups including political 
bosses, bureaucrats and industrialists and the Partido 
Trabalhista Brasilerio (PTB) was composed principally 
of urban workers. The anti-Vargas forces were united 
in the Uniao Democratica Nacional although each of the 
groups also formed their own parties on a regional basis. 
These parties "were often described as non-ideological, 
personalistic, and opportunistic--in short, not to be 
regarded as modern political parties. 1110 Richard Nyrop 
goes further in his criticism of the ineffectiveness 
of the party system in Brazil. 
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Neither ideological nor representative of constituent 
interest, these parties functioned to channel local 
political mechanism, headed by paternalistic bosses, 
into the national electoral arena. Personalism 
pervaded the party machinery: delivering votes 
brought patronage in the form of government jobs, 
federal 1 ~evelopment projects, and cash to local bosses. 
In summary, the party system as it developed during 
the democratic era did not function in such a manner 
as to provide legitimacy for the system or to serve 
the usual functions of interest aggregation and articulation. 
Another area of Brazil's development that has contributed 
to instability is social mobilization. Mobilization 
in Brazil has been rather slow and has involved three 
major groups. The first group to be mobilized was the 
urban middle class that grew up after World War I. 
The middle class was organized into three interest groups. 
The first, the Brazilian Rural Confederation, represented 
large and medium sized landowners. The other two were 
the National Confederation of Commerce and the National 
Confederation of Industry. "The three groups were semi-public 
bodies. They were set up originally during the Estado 
Novo as employer syndicates to organize class support 
for the regime, and they have continued to be more or 
1 d t t t 1 . th 1112 ess un er s a econ ro since en .... 
The second stage of mobilization in Brazil included 
the urban working class. The major vehicle for mobilization 
was the labor union and, as has been pointed out previously, 
these organizations also came under lhe con lrol or llw 
government when the socialist and communist organizers 
became too successful. 
The third group to be mobilized were the peasants 
during Goulart's administration. The rise of the Peasant 
Leagues in the northeast has been traced, in part, to 
the revival of the sugar industry in the 1950s. 13 Instead 
of modernizing production methods, sugar growing was 
expanded to the plots of land that the peasants had 
been allowed to use for subsistance farming. Under 
the new system, the peasants were paid a wage for growing 
sugar on the small plots. The wages were of course 
kept low in order to maximize profits for the landowner. 
This resulted in a decrease in the standard of living 
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of the peasants and an increase in the number of organizations 
such as the Peasant Leagues that represented the interest 
of the rural workers. 
The effect that mobilization had on political development 
is well stated by Ronald Schneider. After World War 
II, "Brazil's evolution toward a civic polity floundered 
on the incapacity of its institutions to adapt to expansion 
of participation by the urban working class and the 
political awakening of the peasantry. 1114 
In recent years, Brazil has experienced electoral 
mobilization as well as social mobilization. The major 
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factor affecting electoral mobility has been increases 
in the literacy rate. Literacy has always been a requirement 
for voting in Brazil, and as recently as 1950 about 
50 percent of Brazil's population was illiterate. Due 
largely to the literacy programs instituted by the military 
government, the literacy rate now stands at about 75 
percent. Electoral mobilization has been felt more 
strongly in the urban centers. "The growth of the urban 
electorate has proved an effective challenge to the 
control of the electoral system by parties of the oligarchy. 1115 
Brazil's development provides an excellent example 
in support of the theory that when mobilization exceeds 
the capacity of the political institutions to process 
the demands on it, instability results.. "Not only in 
the 1961-1964 crisis but in those that preceded and 
even during the 1920s, a major factor in Brazil's political 
instability was the gap between the rate of social change 
and mobilization of new groups into politics on the 
one hand and the very slow development of political 
organizations and institutions on the other. 1116 
Military Rule (1964-1985) 
The military has had a long tradition of involvement 
in the political affairs of Brazil. That institution 
inherited the "moderating power" originally held by 
the emperor and has made liberal use of it with respect 
to preserving the legitimacy of government. Between 
1930 and 1961, the army intervened as arbitrators in 
political conflicts on five different occasions. 17 Only 
in 1964 did it remain in power. 
The post-1964 military regime has been unique in 
that it has been neither a short-lived transition 
nor a period of personalist rule. Rather, the 
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armed forces have ruled as an institution, faithfully 
adhering to heirarchial principles of discipline, 
promotions and retirement in order to preserve 18 the institutional integrity of the officer corps. 
Five generals have headed Brazil's government since 
the 1964 coup. Although they have differed somewhat 
in personality and style, they have followed policies 
that were intended to alleviate some of the most unstable 
features of Brazil's political system and gradually 
return the country to civilian control. 
Upon taking office the military moved to purge 
the congress, eventually removing over 100 federal legislators 
who posed the greatest threat to military rule. Thousands 
of former political leaders were sent into exile. The 
first priority of the military was to solve the country's 
economic problems. To do that they needed peace and 
there could be no peace without authority. To this 
end Castelo Bronco, the first military president, announced 
Institutional Act No. 2 in October of 1965, which provided 
for the elimination of all existing political parties, 
an increase in presidential power, and the extension 
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of his term of office to March 1967. 19 Two official 
parties were created: the National Renovating Alliance 
(ARENA) which was the government's party and the Brazilian 
Democratic Movement (MDB) which represented the opposition. 
ARENA was quite naturally electorally successful 
for many years~ considering that in some elections as 
many a~ 6 million blank ballots were cast and another 
10 million Brazilians did not bother to vote. By 1978, 
however, it appeared that ARENA was about to lose its 
majority in congress. In response the president, General 
Ernesto Geisel, dismissed congress and in 1979 issued 
the Law of Party Reform which was designed to split 
the MDB while preventing the proliferation of small 
t . 20 par ies. 
Thus having established authority, the military 
could pursue its economic goals without being concerned 
with the political consequences of its harsh stabilization 
measures. However, in the late 1960s Brazil experienced 
a rise in urban terrorism as did other countries at 
that time. The military responded with repression but 
not to the extent that it was used in Argentina or Chile. 
Repression was primarily a reflection of the military's 
priorities. "The turn to stricter political controls 
after December 1968 reflected the military's continuing 
disillusionment with seemingly inept and corrupt civilian 
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politicians, and its firm belief that economic growth, 
made possible by foreign confidence in Brazil's stability, 
must be given precedence over social justice. 1121 
The military has made gradual but steady progress 
toward turning the government back to democratically 
elected bodies. "After 1978 congress again became a 
stabilizing influence in providing political support 
and legitimacy to President Figueiredo's efforts at 
abertura. 1122 By 1980 the plan of abertura or "opening 
up of the political system" had gathered speed. Over 
5,000 political exiles were granted amnesty and allowed 
to return to the country. Also, "For the first time, 
labor leaders were successfully disseminating protest 
literature among the unemployed--a tactic made possible 
by the relative success of the past 1964 campaign--to 
increase literacy among the lower classes. 1123 As further 
evidence of abertura, by 1981 opposition parties held 
a majority of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies for 
the first time since 1965. Additionally, the bureaucracy 
was no longer suppressed and began to serve "as a most 
important channel for the exercise of influence by interest 
groups, owing to the weakness of such institutions as 
congress and political parties that perform such functions 
in other countries." 24 
As might be expected, the prudence of abertura 
and its chances 1or success have not been enthusiastically 
155 
accepted by all segments of society. The only open 
opposition to the plan came from the right-wing of the 
military. However, because of the policies of forced 
retirement at age 65 or after two years without promotion, 
President Joao Baptista Figueiredo has been able to 
effectively eliminate this opposition. Other threats 
to the success of the return to civilian rule are the 
poor state of the Brazilian economy and its lack of 
democratic traditions. Currently, Brazil has the largest 
foreign debt of any nation; its population is growing 
at an annual rate of 2.7 percent; and over 1.6 million 
25 
new jobs must be created each year. 
Since plans for abertura were first announced, 
the people's immodest demands for an immediate return 
to civilian government have on several occasions cast 
doubt on the success of the plab. In 1981 over 100,000 
teachers struck throughout Brazil to force the immediate 
replacement of the military. More recently, in April 
of 1984, a crowd of 1 million demonstrated in Rio de 
Janeiro in favor of direct election of the civilian 
• 
26 president rather than election by the electoral college. 
Some writers have even expressed skepticism about 
the sincerity of the military in allowing a truly open 
political system. "It is hence the purpose of abertura 
to engineer adequate safety valves and a sense of participation 
without real surrender of authority .... It should get 
away from dictatorship without opening the doors to 
anarchy, seeking legitimation with minimal sacrifice 
of power. 1127 
The true test of abertura will come when the newly 
elected civilian president, Tancredo Neves, takes office 
in March of 1985. During his campaign, he has offered 
several proposals that, if enacted, should facilitate 
the transition to civilian rule without disruption. 
1 5G 
His proposals would strengthen legislative power, reduce 
the power of the federal presidency and respect the 
authority of local and regional officials with the federal 
system. He has also been careful to praise the armed 
forces as the pillar of the republic," realizing their 
pivotal role in the success of the new government. 
Pang and Jarnagin conclude that "So long as the next 
president succeeds in convincing the military that he 
will not deliver the government to the radical left, 
his rule should be stable. 1128 
External Influences 
After World War II, the United States replaced 
Great Britain as the foreign power that most influenced 
Brazil's political and economic life. While direct 
interference in Brazilian politics did not reach the 
same level that it later did in Chile, the United States 
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was not wholly innocent in trying to exert its influence 
when events there were perceived as a threat to United 
States interests. 
Although there were certain accusations leveled 
at the United States stemming from the suicide note 
left by Gutelo Vargas, the most concerted effort of 
the United States involved the ousting of President 
Goulart. In the early 1960s, the United States government 
became concerned over the leftist tendencies of the 
Goulart administration and feared the creation of a 
Cuban-style communist dictatorship in Brazil. Ac~tually 
almost from the time Goulart took office, the United 
States Ambassador had been in contact with the military 
officers who were secretly planning Goulart's overthrow. 
"The conspirators had indicated that a coup was being 
planned and that if it was to succeed they were going 
to need economic coopertion and assistance from the 
United States in getting the government and the economic 
1 . . . ,,29 po icy moving again. The United States made no binding 
commitment but indicated that such a request under those 
circumstances would be favorably received. 
While keeping covert contact with the military 
conspirators on the surface, the United States continued 
cordial relations with the Goulart government. But 
As the more established avenues of diplomatic relations 
failed to achieve the desired cooperative spirit in 
Brazil, U.S. diplomats made efforts to influence the 
internal workings of the Brazilian political system. 
Officials at the State Department told Ambassador Campos 
that through Robert Kennedy's visit they hoped to affect 
Goulart's cabinet choices. 30 
The United States Embassy proceeded to contribute 
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funds in support of certain candidates in the 1962 election 
and additional money was made available to the military. 
"The large military assistance program was considered 
important in generating a pro-U.S. posture by that group, 
which was, in turn, considered critical in the 'strategy 
for restraining the left-wing excesses of the Goulart 
government. 11131 
When the coup became eminent it was felt that direct 
military support from the United States would be resented 
by the Brazilian people. However, plans under the code 
name of "Brother Sam" were developed whereby the United 
States would provide petroleum supplies that would be 
crucial to the success of the military if civil war 
broke out. In addition to the petroleum, the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff authorized that certain quantities of 
arms and ammunition marked "Brother Sam" be readied 
B ·1 32 for air lift to raz1 . As reported earlier, these 
preparations were unnecessary since there was oniy minimal 
opposition to the coup which fizzled after a few days. 
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Foreign influences on Brazil's economic development 
have been those typically associated with third world 
countries. Initially as a primary producer Brazil's 
economic position was affected by the demand for its 
products on the world market. As industrial development 
occurred, the country became dependent upon foreign 
technology and investment capital. But Brazil has dcve l opc)cl 
more industrial self-sufficiency than most peripheral 
countries and has in recent decades lessened its dependency 
on trade with the United States. Brazil has increased 
its circle of major trading partners to include Japan, 
West Germany and the Eastern Bloc countries. The current 
foreign debt crisis is Brazil's most serious problem. 
The austerity measures imposed by the International 
Monetary Fund as a precondition for debt restructuring 
have caused frustration and hardship especially among 
the working class population. These frustrations coming 
at the same time as abertura could place too heavy a 
demand on Brazil's weak institutional capacity and threaten 
the success of new democracy. 
Summary 
Given the relative stability of Brazil in the 19th 
and early 20th centuries, it is disappointing that Brazil 
has experienced the same political instability that 
other Latin American countries have experienced. Brazil's 
instability can be traced to a continuing lack of a 
political consensus and legitimacy of government. These 
deficiencies have become increasingly acute as the size 
of the electorate has increased and the society has 
160 
become more mobilized. Perhaps the major cause of instability 
has been the underdevelopment of Brazil's political 
institutions and processes. The inadequacy of these 
institutions and processes also has been accentuated 
by the expansion of the electorate and the growth of 
the public sector of the economy. 
External factors have not been a major cause of 
instability in Brazil. Although there has been foreign 
meddling in Brazil's internal politics, and foreign 
governments and lending institutions have from time 
to time tried to dictate the pattern of economic development, 
they are greatly overshadowed by internal factors as 
the major cause of political instability. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this paper has been to examine the 
factors that have affected political stability in Latin 
America. A survey of political development literature 
revealed two sets of theories, one attempting to explain 
political stability, and the other instability. These 
theories, when applied to Mexico, seemed to be supported 
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by the case history of that country's political development. 
J\n examination of the other c.:ountrie~ in the study 1·(~V(':t l1·d 
that the factors for stability have been largely absent 
from their political development experience. 
This concluding chapter will attempt to present 
a comparative analysis of the factors for stability 
and instability as they have operated in the countries 
surveyed, and also to offer some observations as to 
steps that might be taken to achieve greater political 
stability. 
The political consensus that was achieved in Mexico 
after the Revolution has not developed in Argentina, 
Chile or Brazil for any appreciable length of time. 
Argentina was approaching a consensus with the incorporation 
of the new urban middle class into the political process 
as a result of the Saenz Pena reforms. However, the 
consensus broke down when the urban working class emerged 
as a potent political force and realized that their 
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needs and demands were not being addressed by the existing 
political system. A political consensus was developed 
in Chile in the 1930s and was an important factor in 
the stability that the country enjoyed for several decades. 
In the 1960s and early 1970s, however, the consensus 
disappeared as the country became increasingly divict0d, 
especially during the Allende administration. In Brazil 
a consensus was easily achieved and maintained so long 
as the politically active population was small and the 
rest of the people were politically disinterested. 
In contrast to the past, however, political mobilization 
has increased at a rapid rate in recent years. Achieving 
a consensus on the goals and directions of the government 
must be a major objective of the new administration 
if stability is to be achieved. 
At the present time, Argentina and Brazil seem 
on the verge of developing a political consensus. A 
major test of the civilian governments will be to maintain 
the consensus by addressing the needs of all of the 
groups in their respective societies. Unfortunately, 
however, the development of a political consensus does 
not appear to be imminent in Chile. Opposition to Pinochet 
is spreading and the county is becoming increasingly 
divided. The middle class which had backed General 
Pinochet is withdrawing its support but at the same 
time not condoning the terrorist activities of the left. 
The lack of legitimacy as well as consensus has 
contributed to political instability in Argentina, Chile 
and Brazil. The major cause of illegitimacy has been 
the repeated military interventions and ineffectiveness 
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of civilian governments. Legitimacy has been achieved 
with the return to civilian rule in Argentina and Brazil, 
but it can be maintained only so long as the governments 
are effective in dealing with the staggering economic 
problems and in balancing the demands of the conservative 
and liberal elements. For both Argentina and Brazil, 
stability will also depend upon how successful the civilian 
governments are in reducing the political role of the 
military. In Argentina this might be somewhat easier 
to achieve. The military government was greatly discredited 
by its stunning defeat in the war with Great Britain 
and in the widespread violations of human rights. The 
members of the junta have been arrested and are to stand 
trial. Raul Alfonsin has taken steps to permanently 
reduce the role of the military. He wants to establish 
a chain of command that begins with the president, the 
minister of defense, the joint chiefs of staff and then 
to the heads of the branches of the armed forces. For 
Brazil, the problem of permanently subordinating the 
military to civilian authority may be more difficult. 
Although there has been widespread popular support for 
a return to civilian rule, the military in Brazil has 
not suffered the loss of prestige that the Argentine 
military suffered. 
In Chile, the legitimacy of Pinochet's government 
is seriously questioned as he resorts more and more 
to repression to maintain control. There appears to 
be no easy solution to Chile's dilemma. Given the Jong 
tradition of democracy in Chile, it is unlikely the 
military government will be considered legitimate, and 
it appears that the military is not about to return 
the government peacefully to civilians as was the case 
in Argentina and Brazil. 
Perhaps the weakness of political institutions 
in Argentina, Chile and Brazil has been the major factor 
contributing to instability. The lack of institutional-
ization has resulted from the prevalence of personalism, 
oligarchic control of the political process in order 
to perpetuate class interest, and the often overpowering 
political presence of the military. Personalism seems 
to be on the decline in Argentina and Brazil. Alfonsin 
and Tancredo Neves were not major political figures 
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or heads of political organizations before their elections. 
They seem to have been chosen on the basis of the people's 
confidence in their ability to address the current problems 
that their countries face. This could be an important 
step toward institutionalization of the office of the 
president. 
Institutionalization in Argentina, Brazil and Chile 
will also require some modification of the role of the 
legislature and of political parties in the political 
process. In Argentina and Brazil, the legislature must 
become a functioning institution whose powers are not 
overshadowed by the executive. For the political party 
system to become a more effective institution, the number 
of parties must be reduced and their base of support 
broadened. This could, perhaps, be achieved by creating 
single member districts. 
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Based on the developmental histories of the countries 
in this study, external factors have not contributed 
significantly to political instability. While the dependent 
status of these countries in the world economic system 
has from time to time caused economic problems as is 
currently the situation because of huge foreign debts, 
its impact is overshadowed by domestic factors. The 
intervention of the United States in Chilean politics 
in the Frei and Allende administrations was destabilizing 
but constitutes a rather isolated incident. External 
factors should play even less of a role in the future 
as countries reduce their dependence on one "center" 
country by diversifying their markets as Brazil has 
done in recent years. 
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Appendix A 
Mexico 
1911 
1913 
HEADS OF GOVERNMENT 
Profirio Diaz resigned as result of revolution 
led by Francisco Madero; Madero became president 
Madero forced out of office by Victoriano Huerta 
Huerta forced to resign 
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1914 
1917 Constitution written and Venustiano Carranza elected 
president 
1920 Carranza forced out of office Obregon, Alvara 
1924 
1928 
1930 
1934 
1934 
1940 
1946 
1952 
1958 
1964 
1970 
1976 
1982 
taken in 
Plutarco Elias Calles elected president 
Emilio Portex Gil (interim) 
Pascual Ortiz Rubino 
Abelardo L. Rodriguez (interim) 
Lazaro Cardinas elected president 
Manuel Avila Comanche elected president 
Miguel Aleman Valdes elected president 
Aldolfo Ruiz Cortines elected president 
Adolfo Lopez Mateos elected president 
Gustavo Dias Ordaz elected president 
Luis Echeverria elected president 
Jose Lopez Portillo elected president 
Miguel de la Madrid elected president 
Argentina 
1916 Hipolito Yrigoyen elected president 
1922 Marcelo Alvear elected president 
1928 Yrigoyen elected to a second term 
1930 Yrigoyen overthrown by military coup; General 
Jose Uriburu assumes the presidency 
1932 General Agustin P. Justo challenges authority 
of Uriburu and is elected president 
1938 Roberto M. Ortiz elected president 
1940 Ill health forces Ortiz's resignation and Ramon 
Castello becomes president 
1943 Castello removed by military coup and General 
Edelmio Farrel assumes the presidency 
1946 Juan Domingo Peron elected president 
1955 Peron removed by military coup and General Eduardo 
Lonardi assumes the presidency from September 
until November when General Pedro Aramburu takes 
over the presidency 
1958 
1962 
1963 
1966 
1970 
Dr. Arturo Frondizi elected president 
Frondizi is removed and General Jose Maria Guido 
serves as acting president for 18 months 
Dr. Arturo Illia elected president 
Illia is removed by military coup and General 
Juan Carlos Onganea becomes president 
Onganea forced to resign and Robert M. Levingston 
serves as figure head president 
1971 General Alijuandro Lanusse replaces Levingston 
as president 
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1973 Hector Campora elected and serves as president 
from May until July 
1973 Juan Domingo Peron elected president 
1974 Peron dies and his vice president and wife Isabel 
Peron assumes the presidency 
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1976 Senora Peron is removed by military coup and General 
Jorge Videla assumes the presidency as leader 
of the three man junta 
1981 Roberto Viola assumes the presidency and serves 
until he is replaced by Leopoldo Galtieri 
1982 Galtieri is forced to resign and General Cristno 
Nicolides serves as interim president 
1982 Reynaldo Bignone is appointed and elections are 
held 
1983 Raul Alfonsin elected by the people to serve a 
6 year term 
Chile 
1817 Independence from Spain 
1830 Autocratic republic under President Diego Portales 
1871 Liberal republic created by coalition of parties 
1891 Parliamentary republic organized to reduce strong 
executive power; move to congress 
1921 Arturo Alessandri elected president; liberal reform 
1924 Military closes congress; Alessandri installed 
as president with decree power 
1927 Colonel Carles Ibanez seizes power and becomes 
dictator 
1931 Colonel Marmaduke Grove creates socialist republic 
of Chile that lasts six months 
1932 
1952 
1958 
1964 
1970 
1973 
Brazil 
Rep. gov. restored and Arturo Alessandri elected 
president 
Carlos Ibanez elected president (populist) 
Conservative liberal candidate Jorge Alessandri 
elected president 
Dr. Eduardo Frei elected president 
Salvador Allende elected president 
Military coup ended 41 years of uninterrupted 
constitutional governors; General Augusto Pinochet 
became president and supreme ruler 
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1930 Washington Luis removed by military coup and Getuleo 
Vargas installed as president 
1934 Vargas' presidency extended 4 years by new constitution 
1945 Vargas overthrown by the military 
1950 Getuleo Vargas elected president 
1954 Vargas commits suicide 
1955 Juscelino Kubitschek elected president 
1960 Jania Quadros elected president 
1961 Quadros resigns and is replaced by vice president 
Joao Goulart; military imposes parliamentary system 
1963 National plebiscite restores presidential system 
1964 Goulart overthrown by military coup; Marshall 
Humberto Castelo Branco elected by the congress 
1967 Marshal Arturo Costa e Silva selected president 
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1969 Costa e Silva resigns for health reasons and General 
Emilio Garr Cestazu Medici assumes the presidency 
1974 General Ernesto Geisel selected as president 
1979 General Joao Baptista Figueiredo selected president 
1984 Tancredo Neves elected president 
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